An op-ed by COE Senior Advisors Staffan Westfahl and Aaro Suonio

However and whenever large-scale fighting in Ukraine ends, the country will face an enormous task. Beyond rebuilding infrastructure, Ukraine will need to restore security and the rule of law across its territory, support returning refugees, reintegrate veterans, and make sure that wartime criminal structures do not simply adapt to a peacetime environment. How this is handled will shape not only Ukraine’s internal stability and its path towards EU membership, but also the European Union’s own security for years to come. 

The EU’s civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – the family of civilian missions that support partners with police, justice and wider security-sector reform – was designed to deal with precisely such situations. In Ukraine, the key instrument is the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM Ukraine), established in 2014 to advise on civilian security sector reform. Over more than a decade, it has become the EU’s main civilian security presence in the country, with several hundred staff and an extensive network across the Ukrainian security and justice institutions. This broader question also reflects President von der Leyen’s call at the 2026 Munich Security Conference to “urgently recalibrate the way we use our entire policy toolbox” – a reminder that security, recovery, reform and resilience can no longer be treated as separate policy tracks. 

As the ‘day after’ is increasingly discussed in Brussels and in capitals, an important question emerges: how should EUAM and the wider civilian CSDP adapt to this new phase so that they genuinely support Ukraine’s recovery and accession, while also protecting EU internal security? 

The broader recovery architecture – and what is missing 

The EU and its partners have already created a substantial architecture to support Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction, and reform. 

At the heart of this is the Ukraine Facility (2024–2027), the EU’s main financial instrument for Ukraine. Built around a joint Ukraine Plan, it provides budget support, investment guarantees and funding for reforms linked to EU membership. The associated Ukraine Investment Framework is designed to mobilise public and private investment in areas such as infrastructure, energy, business development and public services. 

To coordinate international support, the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform for Ukraine brings together Ukraine, the EU, G7 partners, and major international financial institutions. Its task is to align financial flows with Ukraine’s most urgent needs, avoid duplication, and encourage a more strategic use of resources. The annual Ukraine Recovery Conferences, most recently held in London and Berlin, have become important political and technical gatherings where governments, local authorities, international organisations, financial institutions and the private sector identify priorities, showcase projects and launch new initiatives. 

Taken together, these instruments and fora already form a dense framework for macro-financial support, reconstruction planning, donor coordination, and private-sector engagement. Yet one element is still underdeveloped: there is no equally structured and visible security and justice ‘pillar’ within this architecture. Questions about weapons and explosives, about borders and trade routes, about organised crime and corruption, and about the resilience of Ukraine’s security institutions are discussed in many different formats, but often without a clear focal point. 

This gap is where a more ambitious and better integrated role for EUAM Ukraine could add value. 

What EUAM Ukraine does today 

EUAM Ukraine’s current mandate is to provide strategic advice, mentoring, training and project support in four main areas: 

• Civilian security sector reform: including support to police, prosecution services, the judiciary and other law-enforcement bodies; 

• Integrated border management: helping border guards and customs services to improve risk analysis, coordination, and cooperation; 

• Liberated and adjacent territories: assisting authorities to restore policing and rule-of-law functions in areas affected by occupation and heavy fighting; 

• International crimes: providing expertise to Ukrainian institutions investigating and prosecuting serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. 

Beyond these thematic priorities, EUAM Ukraine provides strategic advice and practical support for specific reform measures in line with EU standards and international principles of good governance and human rights, including in support of Ukraine’s EU accession-related commitments. Within its current mandate, the mission works closely with its Ukrainian partners to assist them in implementing the Overarching Strategic Plan for the Reform of the Entire Law Enforcement Sector (OAS) and its Action Plan, as well as other relevant reforms across the civilian security sector. 

Human rights, gender equality, good governance, and anti-corruption are intended to run across all these activities. Based on this work, the mission has built up a strong network of relationships with Ukrainian ministries, agencies and services, as well as with other international actors in the field. 

At the same time, the EU’s overall civilian CSDP system is under significant strain. Limited planning capacity in Brussels must support numerous missions and emerging flexible tools in several regions. There is a risk that, without timely adaptation and prioritisation, EUAM’s role in Ukraine’s ‘day after’ is defined mainly by inertia rather than by deliberate choice. 

Risks and opportunities around post-conflict phase 

If the civilian CSDP posture in and for Ukraine remains largely unchanged, several risks could materialise. 

First, there is a risk of fragmentation. In a post-war setting, many international organisations, bilateral donors and non-governmental actors will seek to support Ukraine’s security and justice reforms. Without a visible and well-anchored EU civilian security platform, efforts could overlap or even pull in different directions, and the EU’s added value would be less than the sum of its parts. 

Second, overstretching is a real concern. EUAM is already operating close to the limits of its current mandate and resources. At the same time, the broader civilian CSDP framework faces planning and operational demands in other regions, from the Middle East to the Caucasus. Without additional staffing and clearer prioritisation, trying to expand EUAM’s role significantly may simply dilute its impact. In this context, planning also needs to consider the possible implications of stability policing requirements within an EUAM mandate. 

Third, sustained engagement requires political unity. Over time, differing threat perceptions, domestic pressures or competing crises may make it more difficult to maintain a common EU line on Ukraine. A realistic, clearly articulated civilian engagement strategy – with visible benefits for both Ukraine and EU internal security – could help sustain that unity. 

Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, there are substantive security risks. If weapons and explosives are not properly secured or destroyed, if criminal networks are allowed to capture parts of the reconstruction process, if borders and trade routes are not well managed, and if veterans and returning displaced persons do not receive adequate support, these problems will not remain confined to Ukraine. They will affect the EU’s own security and cohesion. 

On the other hand, there are significant opportunities. A carefully designed civilian security engagement could help Ukrainian institutions consolidate their reforms, reduce risks for EU internal security, and generate lessons about resilience under pressure that are relevant for Member States themselves. 

Possible directions for a more ambitious EUAM 

If the EU decides to adapt EUAM Ukraine for the ‘day after’, what might this look like in practice? While any mandate change would have to be agreed by all Member States, several potential directions can be identified in broad terms, whereas also the advisory, capacity-building and partnership engagement need to reflect Ukraine’s needs when it comes to policing in stabilisation of war affected areas.  

One important area is the management of weapons, ammunition, and explosives. Supporting Ukrainian authorities to map, secure and safely destroy surplus stocks, improving tracing systems and strengthening information-sharing with European partners would directly reduce the risk that weapons from the war fuel criminal markets inside the EU. 

A second line of effort could focus on protecting reconstruction funds from criminal and corrupt capture. Here, EUAM could work with anti-corruption bodies, financial intelligence units, prosecutors and law-enforcement services to identify vulnerabilities in public procurement and major investment projects. By helping to design and implement integrity safeguards, the mission could support Ukrainian and EU efforts to ensure that reconstruction funds are used effectively and transparently. 

A third cluster concerns borders, trade corridors, and mobility. Working with border and customs authorities in Ukraine and neighbouring EU Member States, EUAM could contribute to securing key trade and logistics routes, strengthening risk analysis and information-sharing, and supporting joint responses to trafficking, smuggling and other cross-border threats. 

A fourth focus area involves veterans, community security, and social cohesion. Supporting local authorities and police to develop community-based approaches, manage tensions linked to demobilisation and returns, and prevent radicalisation would be crucial for long-term stability in many parts of Ukraine. 

Finally, Ukraine’s experience in keeping critical infrastructure functioning under sustained attack offers valuable lessons. EUAM could help Ukrainian partners strengthen legal and institutional frameworks for infrastructure protection, improve cooperation between public authorities and private operators, and understand and counter hybrid threats, including disinformation directed at security and justice institutions. 

Across all these areas, environmental impacts and gender equality should be treated as integral parts of planning, implementation and monitoring rather than as separate add-ons. 

Towards a partnership platform 

For EUAM to play such a role, it would likely need to evolve from a classic advisory mission towards more of a partnership platform that connects advice, coordination, and concrete activities. 

This might include a stronger project component, allowing the mission to support or host targeted, security-related projects financed by the EU instruments and Member States; closer linkage with relevant EU financial tools, so that security-sector insights are systematically fed into investment and reform decisions; and more structured cooperation with EU justice and home affairs agencies and international organisations active in the security and rule-of-law field. 

Crucially, such an evolution would not change the mission’s civilian and non-executive nature. Rather, it would make better use of EUAM’s position and expertise in support of Ukraine’s recovery and of Europe’s own security interests. 

Conclusion 

Ukraine’s future, and the EU’s relationship with it, will be shaped not only by military developments at the front, but also by what happens the day after the guns fall silent. Recovery and reconstruction are more than rebuilding bridges and power plants; they are about restoring safety, justice and trust in institutions. 

The EU has already mobilised substantial financial and political resources for Ukraine’s recovery. What is less developed is a coherent, visible and forward-looking civilian security component within that broader effort. EUAM Ukraine, as the EU’s main civilian security presence in the country, is well placed to fill this gap – if its mandate, its connections to other EU instruments and its planning support are adjusted in time. 

Decisions taken in the coming period – on the mission’s future role, on how it links to the wider recovery architecture, and on the resources devoted to civilian planning – will determine whether the EU can move from reacting to events to shaping a more secure and resilient ‘day after’ for Ukraine and for itself. 

The authors approach this topic drawing on their established expertise in civilian CSDP and rule of law, rather than acting as regional experts on Ukraine. The views expressed are entirely personal and do not reflect the official position of the CoE.