Hybrid Threats

30 November -0001

The Use of Russian Proxy Actors in the Media Environment in Ukraine

Reports, articles, briefs Public 2025 NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence

This NATO report examines the structure, development, and messaging of Russian proxy media in Ukraine before and after the full-scale invasion in 2022. The thorough information on Russian information strategy is an important tool for EU actors countering Russian disinformation in Ukraine and elsewhere.

Following the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and occupation of parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, the Russian state began building centrally coordinated proxy media outlets in occupied and unoccupied areas of Ukraine, which expanded as Russia occupied additional territories after the 2022 invasion. After the ban on Russian social networks by the Ukrainian government in 2017, the Russian state developed a system of media influence via television, YouTube, and Telegram channels. Russian exploitation of natural resources in occupied parts of Ukraine was used to fund the media proxies in free Ukrainian territories prior to them being shut down. Russia's network of Telegram channels is coordinated by the GRU (Russian military intelligence).

Narratives in Russian proxy media are consistent across the occupied and unoccupied parts of Ukraine, warning of Western expansionism, defending what they call traditional values, and promoting Russian identity, though they vary by location in intensity and hostility. For example, in Russian-occupied areas where all independent media is banned, media outlets spread propaganda that the Ukrainian government is run by fascists. Meanwhile the rhetoric is toned down in free Ukrainian territory, which says the government is too nationalistic and rewrites history. The media environment in occupied territories is particularly targeted at children to promote identification with Russian identity over being Ukrainian.

The report provides a crucial understanding of Russian proxy media for European strategic communications actors working to counter these messages.

Reference: Vorotyntseva, M., Yurchenko, O., Dikhtiarenko, A., Pakhomenko, S., Husakov, V. & Kaplunov, D. (2024). The Use of Russian Proxy Actors in the Media Environment in Ukraine. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence.

Resource

PDF | 110 pages
Read the full report

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