This report examines how Ukraine has strengthened its wartime energy resilience through the dimensions of protection and recovery, cybersecurity, and strategic communication. It provides valuable lessons to how to address hybrid warfare, relevant to a variety of other civilian CSDP theatres.

The report analyses how Ukraine’s electricity system has managed to continue operating despite sustained Russian kinetic, cyber, and information attacks since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022. The authors argue that energy disruption has been a deliberate element of Russia’s strategy to weaken Ukraine’s economy and societal resilience. Nevertheless, despite the loss of a significant share of generation capacity and repeated attacks on transmission infrastructure, Ukraine has avoided a systemic collapse of its power system. According to the authors, this resilience stems from a combination of pre-existing system redundancies, rapid adaptation of policies and operational practices, strong international support, and effective coordination between government authorities, energy companies, and the armed forces.

The report highlights three main dimensions of wartime energy resilience: physical protection and recovery, cybersecurity, and strategic communication. The authors point out that Ukraine introduced layered protection measures for energy infrastructure, enhanced air defence coordination around critical sites, and developed rapid repair capacities supported by domestic expertise and international assistance. At the same time, Ukrainian institutions strengthened cyber defence following earlier Russian cyber operations against the power grid and built mechanisms to counter disinformation while maintaining public trust and cooperation during energy disruptions. These combined efforts, the authors argue, demonstrate the importance of whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches to safeguarding critical infrastructure under conditions of war.

Looking ahead, the report suggests that future resilience will increasingly depend on decentralised energy systems, including distributed generation, renewable energy sources, and micro- and nano-grids supported by energy storage. While these solutions cannot fully replace large-scale grid infrastructure, the authors argue that they can significantly strengthen crisis resilience when combined with effective policy frameworks, international cooperation, and integrated defence of critical infrastructure. Overall, this report presents Ukraine’s experience as a source of practical lessons for governments, energy operators, and security planners seeking to improve preparedness for wartime or hybrid threats to energy systems.

Reference: Jermalavičius, T., Rõigas, H., Sukhodolia, O., & Teperik, D. (2025). The Staying Power of Ukrainian Lights: Lessons of Wartime Resilience of the Electricity Sector. International Centre for Defence and Security.

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