The Eastern neighbourhood of the EU has become a primary target for Russian foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), particularly in the EU candidate countries of Georgia and Moldova. A new publication highlights the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova) as an effective model for EU mission planners for designing flexible-mandate missions that can build resilience in host countries against hybrid threats.

Russia has increasingly employed FIMI campaigns in Georgia and Moldova to throw these countries off their pathway to EU integration. These attacks have undermined once high pro-EU sentiment, particularly in Georgia. Common narratives include the claim that the that EU accession is a Western ploy that threatens local sovereignty and socio-economic conditions.

The EU has responded by supporting civil society, media, and strategic communication initiatives. However, threats continue on platforms like TikTok and Telegram where Russian narratives dominate and the EU’s presence is minimal. The EUvsDisinfo database identifies FIMI campaigns organised by Russia that oppose EU enlargement. Eastern Partnership funds have supported 2500 local civil society organisations, 120 independent media outlets, and 2000 journalists. Additionally, civilian CSDP missions have been opened in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.

EUPM Moldova is highlighted as a model for EU counter-FIMI efforts due to its flexible and scalable mandate, and its dedication to tackling hybrid threats. The mission provides strategic advice and identifies areas for capability development within Moldovan authorities, including early warning systems, detection methods, and responses to threats. The mission contributed to the foundation of the Centre for Strategic Communication and Combating Disinformation in Chisinau to enhance the collaboration among Moldovan institutions. It also supported the Moldovan government in writing the National Security Strategy and creating the Agency for Cyber Security. Moving forward, EUPM Moldova and its lessons can help the EU develop more flexible missions to build resilience against rapidly developing hybrid threats in host countries.

Reference: Kovalčíková, N., De Agostini, L. & Catena, B. (2025). Strengthening Resilience in the East How the EU can empower countries against foreign interference. European Union Institute for Security Studies.

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