01 February 2026

Divide and Control: An Overview of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI)

This working paper from CMC Finland explains the concept of FIMI based on the EU's operating definition, summarises FIMI activities undertaken by malign actors, especially Russia, and provides an overview of how it affects civilian CSDP in each mission field. It closes with an overview of existing EU tools at the disposal of missions and recommendations for improved countermeasures.

FIMI is an information-based activity carried out by both state and non-state actors that aims to affect values, procedures, or political processes. To count as FIMI it must meet 5 criteria: harmful, mostly legal, manipulative, intentional, and coordinated. Unlike traditional persuasive propaganda, FIMI can also intentionally confuse, divide, or otherwise create chaos beneficial to the perpetrating actor. A key example of FIMI attacks in recent years has been the attacks on the integrity of electoral systems and campaigns to influence electoral outcomes such as in Georgia and Moldova.

Russia is the FIMI actor discussed most in the paper. Russia's core operations are carried out by a network working for the presidency, a key entity being the Social Design Agency, carrying out campaigns against Ukraine, the EU, and NATO using sophisticated tools including fraudulent news websites impersonating European news sources. A key strategic aim of Russian FIMI operations is called reflexive control, a term originating from the Soviet Union. Reflexive control is achieved by manipulating an audience's baseline sense of reality to lead them to reason their way to the manipulator's preferred conclusions.

The author then summarises recent FIMI activities in civilian CSDP host countries. EUM Armenia has been targeted by Russia as a secretly armed military outpost conducting espionage against Armenia. Nearby, Georgia has been the target of extensive Russian FIMI campaigns with the support of local ruling elites, though EUMM Georgia has thankfully not been targeted as it is not seen by the current government as a threat. In Moldova Russian state actors targeted multiple elections in recent years with traditional and social media based FIMI campaigns, but Moldovan institutions have developed effective monitoring and corrective countermeasures through the Centre for Strategic Communication and Combating Disinformation supported by EUPM Moldova. Russian FIMI has been devastatingly effective in the Sahel region by destabilising EU relations with local governments and populations.

In response to these growing threats, the European External Action Service (EEAS) has begun publishing annual threat reports on FIMI, first developing an analytical framework and then tools to counter it. Civilian CSDP missions play an important direct role in monitoring and attribution of FIMI in local media environments, and the author provides recommendations for improvement. In correcting disinformation, greater clarity is needed between mission and EU Delegation responsibilities. Reporting on FIMI should be added as deliverables for relevant mission staff, with training provided before deployment. 

Reference: Collander, S. (2026). Divide and Control: An Overview of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI). CMC Finland.

The views presented in this document belong to the author and do not reflect the official position of the European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management.

Resource

PDF | 28 pages

Read the full paper

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