»Compact 2.0«

Integrating Civilian CSDP into the Strategic Compass

Table of Contents

Introduction

Civilian CSDP can only unleash its full potential if it is appropriately utilised, funded, and integrated in the EU's international security activities. Recent developments in Afghanistan once again illustrate the necessity to complement a predominantly military approach to international conflict resolution with more prevalent civilian components. To be sure, this is not a competition, as both civilian and military CSDP have their place in the EU's security and defence policy. Both offer unique strengths which, if combined, are more than their mere sum. Thus, it is now time to better leverage the unique assets of civilian CSDP and to advance a truly Integrated Approach in action. The following paper hopes to help pave the way towards these goals.

The paper outlines key aspects of civilian crisis management that should form the basis of what has been termed the *Compact 2.0*.[1]

The paper argues that this *Compact 2.0* should, alongside the civilian CSDP Compact, meaningfully inform the emerging Strategic Compass (SC). To support this contribution, the present paper highlights where each of the outlined themes relate to the four baskets of the Compass. It also illustrates specific efforts needed by the three key stakeholder-groups in this realm: EU Member States (MS), EU institutions, and civilian CSDP missions.

The name *Compact 2.0* suggests that there is a need for work on the Civilian CSDP Compact of 2018 to continue the implementation of the 22 commitments beyond early summer 2023. This paper argues that *Compact 2.0* should not, strictly speaking, be an extension of the Compact. Rather, it should augment, sharpen, and build on MS' commitments and outline specifics underpinning the operationalisation of the Compact. Hence,

Compact 2.0 should not be seen as becoming relevant only in summer 2023.

Moreover, given this paper's – and ultimately *Compact 2.0's* – focus on the operational level, the SC could be seen as providing strategic guidance to *Compact 2.0*, while *Compact 2.0* ensures the translation of (leastways parts of) the SC into integrated action. Of note, all areas of *Compact 2.0* should reflect the EU and MS' commitments to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security and the subsequent resolutions.[2]

Compact 2.0 should utilise the Integrated Approach as a guiding principle and lens. In the same way the Approach should be mainstreamed in the SC. This would ensure the latter leverage the strengths of every tool at the EU's disposal, including civilian CSDP.[3]

Upon initiative of EEAS SecDefPol.1, EU MS came together in working groups, so called "Informal NIP-Clusters", to jointly work on the implementation of the Compact. A lot of headway has been made, including with the support of the Centre of Excellence. This cluster-approach should by all means be continued, as cooperation within (line ministries) and between MS is crucial for the overall success of the Compact. Consideration should be given to expand the cluster-approach to the implementation of the Strategic Compass.

Following below is a list of (integrated) themes that should find entry into the *Compact 2.0* and inform the SC. Themes include topics and modalities alike, with modalities referring to tools and methods. In essence, many of the below mentioned themes are not entirely new. They are, however,

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[1] The outlined aspects should be seen as additions to priorities laid out in the Council conclusions of June 2000, the so called "Feira priorities", as well as the response to so called "new" and "hybrid" threats as defined in the Civilian CSDP Compact, such as irregular migration, integrated border management, counterterrorism, and cyber security.

[2] Council of the EU (2018, Dec.). *Women, peace and security: Council adopts conclusions*.

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/12/10/women-peace-and-security-council-adopts-conclusions/

[3] Continuous (integrated) evaluation of EU actions in the realm of its foreign and security policy would help further shaping and systematising priorities and always applying the 'sharpest tool(s) from the EU toolbox'.

for the first time conceptualised as part of a wider framework that addresses the identified issues in an integrated manner.

Lastly, it should be noted that the successful operationalisation of the below themes stands and falls with sufficient strategic financing and resources. Well thought-through policies and narratives are only valuable if they are met with sufficient means to translate them into reality. While the costs of CSDP have significantly increased over the past years, the CSDP budget has not. Thus, the CSDP budget, as part of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) post 2027, should reflect the complexity, multitude, and seriousness of developments to be addressed by civilian CSDP in the coming years and decades.

Themes (as topics)

Climate and Security

The climate-security nexus[4] is increasingly impacting CSDP missions. First, the climate-conflict nexus, including the climate-migration and climate-terrorism nexus, will increasingly fuel instability, creating additional elements of insecurity, including for mission staff and mandate implementation.[5] Second, environmental crime seriously marks the security environment of missions and will increasingly have to constitute a field of interest to missions' operations.[6] Third, climate change will impact the operational environment of missions, requiring adaptations in terms of capabilities and infrastructure, as well as of ensuring duty of care vis-à-vis mission staff. Lastly, missions will have to contribute to efforts to mitigate climate change by reducing their environmental footprint.

Climate change (and the climate-security nexus) does not feature in the Civilian CSDP Compact. To address this shortcoming, the climate-security nexus must be included into the *Compact 2.0*, as well as the Strategic Compass. Attention should be paid to providing a clear definition of what is meant by the climate-security nexus and to clearly outline how it could be operationalised in the context of civilian crisis management[7] (e.g., linking it with the EU Green Deal, the Fit for 55 package,[8] and the EEAS' Climate Change and Defence Roadmap). Given that CSDP is in the remit of MS, the latter should lead the aforementioned effort, supported by the EEAS and other relevant institutions, as needed.

Doing so would inevitably pay tribute to the EU's Integrated Approach by ensuring an approach that is multi-dimensional (spanning security, environmental, development fields) as well as multi-phase (for instance in seeking to address the risk-multiplying aspects of climate change and addressing drivers as well as consequences of conflict).

CRISIS MANAGEMENT
The climate-security nexus should form an integral part of all conceptualisations of EU crisis management, given that the nexus directly or indirectly affects all CSDP missions, and thus the strategic and operational planning of these. Among others, a gendered approach to the climate-security nexus should be applied.[9] Moreover, it should be noted that the "smart mission" concept applies to all green and climate-related solutions in CSDP missions and operations.

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[4] By "climate-security nexus" we mean any impact – whether direct or indirect – that climate change has on security dynamics.
[5] Although the literature on the topic has yet to identify a direct causal connection between climate change and conflict, there is widespread agreement that climate change exacerbates factors which in turn drive conflict and/or terrorism (for instance see Asaka, J. O. (2021). Climate Change – Terrorism Nexus? A Preliminary Review/Analysis of the Literature. *Terrorism Research Initiative*, *15*(1), pp. 81-92).
[6] See for instance, EUPOL COPPS (2019, Oct.). *Environmental crimes become a new area of interest – says Deputy Civilian*

Operations Commander Commander.
https://eupolcopps.eu/single-news/80/en
[7] Where appropriate, the EEAS' Climate Change and Defence Roadmap should be consulted and referenced in this process.
[8] Though the Fit For 55 package has yet to be discussed by the Council and the individual legislative acts are yet to be adopted, the package is likely to play an important role in the EU's climate policy in the coming years.
[9] See for instance: UN News (2020, June). *New UN report highlights link between gender, climate and security*. https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/06/1065982

RESILIENCE
Operationalising the climate-security nexus in the *Compact 2.0* and Strategic Compass would greatly support the resilience of CSDP missions, host countries (through promotion of climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies), and thus of the EU itself (with view to the internal-external security nexus).[10] The dedicated mini-concept could support the exploration of mission-relevant tasks within this field.

CAPABILITIES
Capability needs exist on three levels, namely the strategic (heads of EU institutions, ministries, etc.), tactical (senior management of EU and governmental agencies), and operational (expert-to-expert). With regards to the latter, there is a clear need for expertise on the various aspects of the nexus (climate-conflict nexus; investigation and prosecution of environmental crime; duty of care; missions' footprint including regarding their energy and water supply; sustainable procurement; general analytical capabilities) in CPCC as well as in the missions. Some relevant headway has already been made, with the newly created position of environmental expert in CPCC and two advisers being recruited for the EU missions in Mali and the Central African Republic. This links to the wider need for increased secondments by Member States. Moreover, there is a need for climate-security training. Commitment 5 of the Civilian CSDP Compact calls to "Train their national experts […] including […] specific training needs in new security challenges". The climate-security nexus can be considered such a new security challenge. MS should apply a "one-government" approach to avoid compartmentalisation that would risk climate policy not being mainstreamed in domestic and national foreign policy.

Besides expertise, novel technologies and technical solutions geared towards climate mitigation in the context of CSDP are a capability requiring development and application.

PARTNERSHIPS
It is important to ensure CSDP activities relating to the climate-security nexus are coordinated with those of other institutions, notably the UN, which is already more advanced with regards to exploring the climate-related security risks[11] as well as operationalising the nexus in the context of their operations.[12] With regards to environmental crime, the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, as well as Interpol, should constitute key partners. Leading think tanks, such as adelphi are valuable partners that can provide policy-relevant recommendations on the matter. The World Bank's Global Program on Sustainability may also offer useful insights into environmental risks and opportunities and the protection of natural capital. Partnerships could also be sought with strong civil society organisations who have accumulated solid knowledge on how to translate policy into action. Lastly, partnerships should be built with regional organisations, host countries' authorities, and local communities, ensuring the latter are co-owners of the climate change-related work.

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[10] "It is certainly not enough to understand resilience in narrow CSDP terms. The Compass will have to define resilience as a comprehensive approach that includes a wide range of military, political, societal, economic, and **environmental** dimensions." [emphasis added] (German Council on Foreign Relations (2020). *The Strategic Compass and its Four Baskets*. https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/eus-strategic-compass-and-its-four-baskets

[11] Exemplified for instance by the creation of the UN Climate Security Mechanism.

[12] Some headway has already been made: the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap (2020, p. 10) states, "The EEAS will establish a structural exchange with relevant UN counterparts on climate, energy and environmental aspect of missions and operations including by organising a seminar with the UN Department of Operational Support (DOS) with the aim to exchange experiences and best practice, incl. on the UN Climate Security Mechanism, build staff-to staff network and foster cooperation on the ground".

Security-Development Nexus

If crises are to be addressed in a comprehensive manner, the security-related work – notably CSDP – of the EU must be closely linked up with development activities, including those funded under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), in the context of the 2021-2027 MFF. With regards to NDICI, MS engagement at the level of line ministries would be beneficial so as to ensure national ownership and increase accountability vis-à-vis MS. This would likely require awareness raising of NDICI-funded projects among MS.

At the strategic level, the work of EU delegations, missions, and Commission-funded projects in a specific country must be placed within a single, overarching EU strategy for that country, taking into account the specific context of each country. At the operational level, this means continuous communication and coordination between the work of the different EU actors in the field, with a view to aligning the work with the aforementioned EU strategy for that country. By engaging with partners in increasing their resilience and projecting stability beyond the EU's borders, CSDP missions can, directly or indirectly, support the EU's own security needs by fostering human security, tackling root causes of conflict, and thus mitigating crises and preventing their spill-over effects into the Union.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Working on crisis management should fully reflect the overall EU regional and country strategies, including with regards to development cooperation strategies, also taking into account the need for gender mainstreaming. Also, where relevant, assistance measures under the European Peace Facility (EPF), as well as NDICI, should be fully integrated into the wider EU strategy.

RESILIENCE
With cooperation and complementarity (both on the strategic and the operational level and between different EU instruments) between security and development actors, achieving resilience of host countries becomes a more realistic feat. Resilience inherently depends on the stability of all key pillars of a society, be they economic, political, or security-related. Thus, Commission-funded programmes and those of (integrated) crisis management missions, led by the EEAS, ought to be brought into cohesion by both sides. This should also be reflected in joint strategic communications.

CAPABILITIES
Existing capabilities should be used in a closely coordinated manner to make best use of potential synergies and ensure a fluent practice of interoperability by all stakeholders. There is a need for more regular strategic discussions at the Political and Security Committee (PSC) level on the implementation of the Integrated Approach in specific regional or country contexts. Capability development processes and foresight on the part of the EU would help optimising planning cycles in MS.

This is not to say, however, that more ambitious goals towards operationalising the security-development nexus should not be envisioned. Indeed, to fundamentally boost coordination among CSDP missions and operations and development activities of the EU, a different architecture could and should eventually be considered, taking into consideration the organisation of the UN integrated missions, among others.

Security Sector Reform (SSR)

Security Sector Reform is at the heart of a number of civilian CSDP missions, notably EULEX Kosovo, EUAM Ukraine, EUCAP Sahel Mali, and EUAM Iraq. According to some, the tangible impact of such missions on the reform of the host countries' security sector so far remains limited.[13] Besides operational hurdles, a key impediment seems to be the fact that the work of CSDP missions is somewhat isolated from political processes and realities in host countries.[14,15]

To achieve truly successful SSR, related activities must be in sync – at both the policy, tactical, and operational levels – with all other EU activities in the host country (see previous section). Similarly, an overarching strategy should address the strengthening of law enforcement, state prosecution, courts, and penitentiary. Moreover, SSR should fully address rule of law reform with respect of human rights and tackling corruption. Finally, to evaluate the success of a SSR, specific and agreed upon objectives and goals must be defined at the outset of the mission.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Meaningful SSR requires close cooperation between all civilian (law enforcement, including police, criminal justice, customs, and border guards) as well as military structures. Thus, *Compact 2.0* as well as the Strategic Compass in its crisis management basket, should highlight the necessity to integrate all aforementioned disciplines in SSR at the policy, tactical, and operational levels. Shared or joint planning, conduct, and review of SSR related activities offer a common ground on which the policy and practice can be developed and built.

RESILIENCE
Successful SSR is a determining factor of a country's resilience and should thus be seen as one component (one that is within the realm of crisis management) of a wider EU effort to contribute to resilience-building in host countries.

CAPABILITIES
There is a need for better coordination of existing capabilities. This includes, with a view to the internal-external security nexus, increased inter-ministerial cooperation and coordination between MFA and line ministries (MS level); better coordination between DG HOME and DG JUST (JHA) and EEAS (EU institutions level); and between delegations, NDICI-funded projects, CSDP missions, Frontex, Europol, Eurojust etc. (mission level). Moreover, the European Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENDFOR) could serve as a capability in the context of SSR. Under the European Peace Facility, the EU will be able to provide the armed forces of partner

[13] Larsen, H. (2021). CSDP Missions: Addressing their Limited Reform Impact. *CSS Analyses*. https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse279-EN.pdf

[14] Ibid.
[15] Of course, the complex political and security conditions in the host country and the wider region also play a role.

countries with infrastructure and equipment, including weapons.[16] This calls for strengthened efforts in SSR as well as disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of armed non-state groups.[17] Efforts to strengthen the military and defence capacities of third states and regional and international organisations under the European Defence Fund (EDF) should be consistent with the efforts developed in SSR, as well as DDR.

PARTNERSHIPS
Partnerships and coordinated action should be sought with other missions as well organisations in-theatre. Regarding the latter, a key partner on both the research and operational level is the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance's International Security Sector Advisory Team (DCAF-ISSAT).[18]

Civilian CSDP-JHA cooperation: Operationalising the Internal-External Security Nexus

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Many of the challenges the European Union is facing are of a non-military nature and multi-faceted. These challenges risk undermining not only the host nations and EU interventions in those countries but are also detrimental to European internal security. Clearly, to tackle many of these threats, civilian approaches are needed, concretely covering large parts of the (criminal) justice chain, as well as other sectors of the judiciary. Indeed, military engagement will only succeed with simultaneously a credible and functioning law enforcement, justice, and civil administration build-up.

As outlined in the below baskets, the aspect of secondments of JHA experts in civilian CSDP missions is a central one. In the long term, however, the situation would ideally be one in which CSDP and JHA actors speak with one voice, based on a permanent cooperation mechanism. Although the time does not yet seem ripe for such a mechanism – inter alia because of political and tactical reluctances among EU actors as well as administrative hurdles – we believe that *Compact 2.0* offers an opportunity to put the process on track towards this goal. A critical precondition towards achieving this goal is to highlight the win-win-like nature of

CSDP-JHA cooperation, whereby secondment of JHA actors in CSDP mission constitutes but one of many potential forms of cooperation.

Here, we consider "mini-concepts" as a potential "bridging mechanism", a pilot-effort, which could give a boost to building confidence between all stakeholders involved with the goal that cooperation between civilian CSDP and JHA is accepted as a necessary condition for a more effective and sustainable CSDP.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that enhanced civilian CSDP–JHA cooperation does not mean merging activities. At times it may make more sense to maintain autonomy. Nevertheless, even in these cases, actions must be complementary and aligned, facilitated by regular and transparent communication.

The recommendations under this theme ensure that *Compact 2.0*, and in turn the Strategic Compass, stretches over all sides of the triangle consisting of EU MS, the EU institutions, and EU crisis management missions and operations. In line with the Integrated Approach, this integration and

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[16] Further, the European Peace Facility can be expanded to work with non-military security related projects and activities.
[17] See for instance the UN's Integrated DDR Standards https://www.unddr.org/

[18] See for instance DCAF-ISSAT https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/SSR-in-Practice/Case-Studies

alignment would be multi-dimensional (spanning CSDP and JHA fields); multi-phased (seeking to address root causes of conflicts and thus move towards conflict prevention), and multi-lateral (bringing together various EU institutions, including different DGs, and ministries within MS).

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

If the question "what crisis management should the EU conduct?" is answered by "comprehensive crisis management that addresses root causes of instability", then a focus on operationalising civilian CSDP-JHA cooperation is of critical importance. In particular, more elaboration and specification is needed on the nature of support that civilian CSDP strives to offer to host countries with regards to security and criminal justice. In the realm of terrorism, attention should be paid to countering-terrorism and prevention, countering radicalisation and violent extremism, and countering terrorist financing; with regards to organised crime, the focus should be on financial crime, money laundering, corruption, trafficking in human beings, drugs, smuggling of migrants, cyber security, protection of critical infrastructure; and with regards to hybrid threats efforts should be put into countering disinformation and cyberwarfare. These areas will define what capacity building support the EU shall provide and what capabilities are required for this.

RESILIENCE

Resilience can only be achieved if security risks are addressed comprehensively, i.e. in a way that recognises and makes use of the interdependency of external and national (internal) security, through effective coordination and cooperation between CSDP and JHA actors. Conflicts and instabilities go almost always hand in hand with (and lead to) organised international crime. Thus, it is important to align civilian crisis management with the priorities in the EU policy cycle for organised and international crime and to include them in missions' objectives.

CAPABILITIES

There is a need for capability development at the national level, within EU MS, which requires equal response in the EU institutions and bodies.

First, capability development at national level should focus on inter-ministerial cooperation in foreign policy issues to foster the internal-external security nexus as an integral element of not only one ministry, but all relevant line ministries[19]. Such enhanced inter-ministerial cooperation would likely facilitate the use of a key capability of MS, namely secondment of JHA personnel. Doing so would also bring us one step closer to achieving Commitment 3 of the Compact (70% goal for seconded staff). Lastly, depending on which areas civilian CSDP defines as priority areas (including within the realm of terrorism, organised crime, and hybrid warfare) with view to capacity building efforts in host countries, certain capabilities of EU MS will be required.

Second, at the EU level, strengthened alignment of JHA and CSDP actors should be envisaged: cooperation between EU JHA-actors[20] and the EEAS, as well as cooperative mechanisms between relevant Council working groups[21]. This would *inter alia* raise awareness of CSDP police and criminal justice actions in the relevant JHA working groups and thus relevant JHA actors in capitals. Lastly, a dedicated capacity with JHA-related expertise could be created in the CPCC. In theatre, such structural cooperation between civilian CSDP and

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[19] *Inter alia*, MFA, MoI, MoJ, MoD, MinFin, MinEconDev.
[20] Such as DG Home, DG Just, and EU JHA agencies, like Frontex, Europol, Eurojust, and CEPOL.
[21] Such as FAC/JHA Ministerials, COSI-PSC, COSI-SG, CivCom attended by MS police and criminal justice experts, and more regular CSDP-related discussions in specific JHA Council working group meetings (Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA), High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration (HLWG), Working Party on Terrorism (TWP), Law Enforcement Working Party (LEWP)).

JHA could be achieved for instance by embedding (or temporarily deploying) JHA personnel into missions.[22] Increased secondments by MS is key to strengthening the civilian CSDP missions' capabilities: taking into account missions' important role in information collection and analysis (Commitment 17 of the Compact), as well as in acting as an enabler with regards to the EU's relations with local authorities, the expertise offered by Europol, Eurojust, Frontex, and CEPOL could boost missions' impact and result in new good practices with regards to patrolling, intelligence sharing, investigations, prosecutions, and training. Besides this, the need for capabilities will be determined by which type of capacity-building support the EU can and seeks to provide through its civilian CSDP missions in the aforementioned realms of terrorism, organised crime, and hybrid warfare. Moreover, capabilities should be developed to allow for scenario-based work, which could prove instrumental in the operationalisation of the conceptual framework of civilian CSDP-JHA cooperation.

PARTNERSHIPS
Cooperation with partner countries hosting civilian CSDP missions and operations, including with their relevant civil society organisations and local JHA actors to reform the judiciary (*inter alia* through (civilian) SSR) will be of crucial importance.

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[22] Concrete proposals have already been made by the EU institutions, for example to "start developing a concept for a dedicated crime information cell that could be embedded in a CSDP mission/operation" (Council of the EU (2017)). *Cooperation between*

CSDP missions/operations and JHA agencies. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14265-2017-INIT/en/pdf).

Themes (as modalities)

Mission Preparation, and Training

A significant number of international (contracted but also seconded) staff members joining CSDP missions lack capabilities as they do not receive any pre-mission training, notwithstanding the requirements in the "European Union Policy on Training for CSDP" and the corresponding Commitment 5 of the Compact.[23] The work of the EU Civilian Training Group (EUCTG), including the implementation of the training requirement analyses, need to be taken into account. Besides the impact of the lack of training of new staff on the effectiveness of missions and the implementation of their mandates, such high numbers of staff lacking adequate mission-preparation jeopardise the proper execution of the Duty of Care towards mission staff.

To address this issue, coordinated action by the various stakeholders (MS, national training providers, CPCC, ESDC, EU-funded training projects, CoE) is required not only to align efforts, but also to significantly increase the number of available and timely training opportunities, while strengthening the formal incentives to complete pre-mission training. Thus, the number of opportunities for pre-mission training across the Union should be augmented (i.e., increased).

Moreover, mission preparation (pre-mission training) needs to be aligned with CPCC's Calls for Contributions (CfCs) to ensure that seconded and contracted staff receive adequate preparation across the board.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Crisis management can be improved if personnel seconded to or contracted for missions is better prepared for deployment. This can be agreed in the new version of the CSDP training policy, based on the requirement of training before selection and deployment.

CAPABILITIES
First, there is a need for augmented training opportunities which enhance capacities of personnel to be deployed in missions. This is particularly the case regarding specialised pre-mission preparation for leadership and management personnel,[24] including on gender-responsive leadership. Moreover, besides augmenting training opportunities, different elements of pre-mission training should be aligned and brought in tune with CPCC's CfCs.

Second, integrated conflict analysis, scenario-based approaches, planning, SSR, and change management should become major aspects of capacity building throughout EU mission preparation.

Third, with regards to civilian CSDP-JHA cooperation, language training should be integrated into the basic training/education of police, penitentiary, and other officers in the JHA field.

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[23] Evidently, mission preparation and training are not the sole determinants of a mission member's capabilities and capacities. Among, others, previous experience in the home country or Brussels context is also very important.

[24] Some headway has already been made in this regard. To strengthen 'Leadership and Management' (L&M) training for

CSDP mission leaders, a comprehensive assessment of training requirements (TRA) for civilian CSDP missions was conducted by the Civilian Coordinator for Training (CCT) for L&M and coordinated by CPCC in the framework of the EU Civilian Training Group (EUCTG). The TRA will be presented during the next EUCTG meeting after the summer break with a view to being endorsed.

PARTNERSHIPS
In the realm of mission training, cooperation with NATO (especially in the realm of civil-military training), the UN, and the OSCE needs to be considered. In the realm of civil-military training, gendarmerie-type police forces can play a key role in this regard, by supporting civilian assets with the necessary military knowledge. Partnerships in the field of training, such as Germany's integrated Training Partner Platform[25] can be considered a good practice also for other MS.

Scenario-Based Approach

Scenarios can serve as a useful tool to render abstract policy concepts more tangible, thus speeding up efforts to improve (civilian) crisis management in various domains and across different ministries within MS, different DGs and agencies in Brussels as well as missions (see above section "Civilian CSDP-JHA cooperation").

Scenario-based approaches can help policymakers (both at the national and the EU-level) plan through the strategic, tactical, and operational levels of interventions. The so called "Mini-concepts" developed by EEAS SecDefPol.1 in cooperation with MS could be used as pilot-projects to test

this scenario-based approach from conceptualisation through to their operationalisation with a view to defining a scenario-based approach for civilian CSDP.

Also, a scenario approach can greatly facilitate an integrated approach to the aforementioned three levels (strategic, tactical, operational). Scenarios could be used as one tool within a wider effort by the EU and its MS which would start from strategic foresight, move to threat analysis, and subsequently develop various scenarios on the basis of which capabilities and capacities are required.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Scenario-based approaches should inform the wider crisis management planning process, including Political Framework Crisis Approach (PFCA) and 'Early Warning – Early Action (EWEA), as the "elaborate procedural model in the CSDP ensures the constant involvement of the political level and fosters accountability and oversight by elected governments. Yet it also creates opportunities for political micromanagement that may be ill informed about the operational context and it leaves less room for prudent planning for hypothetical contingencies."[26] A particular focus could be on civil-military cooperation in this realm, also with a view to joint capability planning.

CAPABILITIES
Integrated scenario-based approaches should form an inseparable part of generic mission preparation to enable practitioners to make best use of this modality for the benefit of mandate implementation. Such an approach also requires "new thinking" on the part of planners and operations to develop it into a comprehensive toolbox with different complementary elements. Moreover, in line with the Integrated Approach, an

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[25] https://www.zif-berlin.org/en/partnerships-and-cooperation-initiatives
[26] Mattelaer, A. T. (2010). The CSDP mission planning process of the European Union: innovations and shortfalls. *European* integration online papers (EIoP)*, 14*(9). See also on risk scanning: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/jswd_eu_early_ews_from_vista.pdf

integrated planning process should be developed. This should be done through advanced planning, bringing together military, police, and judiciary planners.

PARTNERSHIPS
A scenario-based approach offers the opportunity to establish structured cooperation between the parties involved, both civilian and military. This cooperation benefits the formulation of mandates and capability planning. In case MS are already using such a methodology to formulate national integrated strategies, it would be beneficial to share experiences.

Civil-Military Cooperation

Civilian CSDP (including JHA) and military CSDP are flip sides of the same coin and should not only be synchronised, but ought to contribute their respective assets to overall EU foreign and security policy. Failure to do so might well result in the two types of CSDP operating largely in a silo, undermining the EU's ability to act 'as one' in using all its assets in a concerted (integrated) manner and could hinder it from becoming a serious foreign policy actor on the global stage.

Against this backdrop, Commitment 19 of the Civilian CSDP Compact (2018, p. 9) calls for "synergies and complementarity between the civilian and military dimensions of CSDP, including in areas of capability development".

There is a need for a boost to the creation and use of synergies between civilian and military missions deployed in the same theatre. At the theatre level, costs could be cut, and efficiency increased through: merging security to protect civilian CSDP, for instance through the supportive close protection of civilian CSDP staff by military;[27] shared analysis of the security situation; interoperability in IT systems; merging of logistical matters, such as equipment, sanitation, food supply, etc. Of course, such cooperation at theatre level presupposes equal cooperation at the strategic and planning levels.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Coordination at the level of the Brussels institutions ought to be strengthened through closer cooperation between the operational civilian and military headquarters (CPCC and MPCC). Achieving complementary and connected (modular) mandates should be considered. Joint scenario development (see also previous theme) could pave the way to this. Moreover, work to strengthen synergies between missions and operations located in the same geopolitical area (e.g. Sahel / Horn of Africa) is required.

CAPABILITIES
In the field of mission preparation (training), closer cooperation between the EU Civilian Training Group (EUCTG) and the EU Military Training Group (EUMTG) (*inter alia*, joint meetings) should be sought. Joint (EU and NATO) civil military (live) exercises as well as joint (and integrated) leadership training should be considered. Capabilities for joint Early Warning – Early Action (EWEA) should be further developed. Moreover, the

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[27] Although existing Status of Mission Agreements (SOMAs) do not allow for military CSDP missions to protect civilian CSDP missions, work should be put in to facilitate this possibility in the future.

EUROGENDFOR has the potential to "bridge" the civilian and military assets. The added value of the EUROGENDFOR lies mainly in its ability to accomplish the full spectrum of police tasks during all phases of a crisis management operation; its flexibility, due to its modular organisation; the capability to cover the deployment and the public security gaps; and the bridging capabilities, which gives EUROGENDFOR the ability to operate under military or civilian command, allowing proper cooperation, coordination, and information sharing among both the Armed Forces and civilian assets. Considering that boundaries between internal and external security are ever thinner, the need for aligning civilian, military and police capabilities is ever growing.

PARTNERSHIPS
Full complementarity between NATO and the EU is to be achieved, including joint foresight and standardisation to complement expertise and improve the robustness of the outcome. See also above on Germany's Training Partner Platform (footnote 20).

Knowledge Management

Informed decisions should be at the essence of civilian crisis management. Hence, knowledge management (KM)[28] is a key precondition for the success of a mission, as well as subsequent ones. Setting up and maintaining proper KM processes and practices is critical for a mission's work in two key ways, both of which are reflected in the subsequent baskets: **(i)** internal KM addressing challenges such as frequent personnel turnover in CSDP missions, establishing and continuously improving structured workflows, and making use of KM tools that ensure that knowledge is preserved and passed on; **(ii)** mission's successfulness with regards to the operational impact of its work.

The latter aspect refers to the evaluation of a mission's work based on lessons-learned. The Civilian CSDP Compact (2018, p. 8) states that a mission should "Carry out the evaluation of the operational impact of missions (...) to identify best practices and possible improvements in mission management." To this end it should "monitor and measure results and progress towards a well-defined end state and transition strategy."

Being true to these commitments, evaluating missions' effectiveness must take place against the backdrop of different projections of what exactly is meant by "effectiveness". Is it restricted to financial management, or does it have to do with the EU posture beyond its borders ("liberal democracy") or is civilian CSDP exclusively a function of the security needs of the EU within its perimeters?[29] Thus, any evaluation needs to first determine specific and agreed goals and objectives to evaluate the mission impact against.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT
(i) CSDP missions are usually launched and start operating under time pressure to deliver on mission mandates and objectives quicky. Against this background, special emphasis should be placed on establishing

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[28] We view Knowledge Management as the process of collecting, sharing, and managing information, such as experiences, as well as the collective effort of building on such information to improve the way we work and the results of this work.

[29] See Ruohomäki, J. (2019, July). *Effectiveness: The Missing Word in Civilian Crisis Management?*, PeaceLab blog. https://www.peacelab.blog/2019/07/effectiveness-the-missing-word-in-civilian-crisis-management

easily replicable structured workflows and KM tools to be used in missions allowing them to focus on delivering on crisis management goals.

(ii) Evaluation of conflict prevention suffers from the ubiquitous prevention dilemma: We will never know which conflict would have broken out had we not engaged in preventing it, and how costly (financially as well as in terms of human suffering or loss of life) it would have been not to prevent it. External evaluation of civilian crisis management, being mindful of this dilemma, should be given consideration as part of a wider and more integrated conceptualisation of context and conflict analysis. It is thus an important element of a continuous process that needs to be set up in an integrated manner, with a strong focus on coordination within the host country between civilian crisis management missions and Commission efforts.

CAPABILITIES

KM needs to be moved from the individual to the organisational level by establishing structured workflows and tools.

(i) Mission personnel can then rely on such workflows and tools and use them from the moment they arrive in missions and familiarise themselves with their position, while they are posted, as well as when they conclude their term in the mission and prepare a handover to a successor.

(ii) Similarly, such workflows and tools are key to ensuring that the lessons-learned coming out of an evaluation of a mission's work are acted upon and future missions improved. Indeed, a key impediment to thorough evaluations, whose results are collected, reviewed, and acted upon, is the current lack of a formal evaluation system, or leastways a formal and transparent evaluation methodology, for missions.

PARTNERSHIPS

(i) Partners such as the UN or OSCE have vast experience in developing and applying internal KM approaches addressing mission and operation levels from headquarters through to field offices. Continuous exchange with those partners will allow the EU to benefit from this body of experience.

(ii) Partnerships with international organisations such as the UN and OSCE are also needed to evaluate whether a mission worked in a truly complementary way with the organisations present in the field. Further, partnerships should be sought with the host country (both the government and civil society), to evaluate where the indicators and benchmarks defined at the outset of a mission were met.

Exit Strategies for Missions

Exit strategies are arguably one of the weak points of CSDP missions. More time and attention need to be invested in developing realistic exit strategies, in terms of sustainability of the conducted efforts, as well as in identifying the conditions under which smooth transition to other (EU or not) activities can occur. The case of Afghanistan illustrates that political settlement is crucial for all other EU instruments to work properly.

Indeed, in the spirit of the Integrated Approach, exit strategies should form part and parcel of the overarching EU strategy in the respective host country, alongside the EU's crisis management as well as diplomatic (delegation) and development (Commission) activities. Besides this, it is of utmost importance that exit strategies, as defined in a mission's Operation Plan (OPLAN), are based on a realistic – rather than highly idealistic – assessment of the situation on the ground. Indeed, formulating high end goals may not be realistic considering decades of required change.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Integrated crisis management requires a predefined and carefully thought-through exit strategy. Thus, exit strategies should already be part of strategic and operational planning, and drafted in close coordination by ISP.3 (strategic) and CPCC (operational). Careful consideration and assessment of the operational impact of strategic decisions should always be an essential prerequisite to strategic decisions, such as the definition of exit strategies.

RESILIENCE
A hasty – or otherwise badly managed – exit from a host country can pose a great risk to a country's resilience and can undo much of the progress previously achieved. At the same time, generic and vague mission goals that can never be fully achieved can contribute to frustration on all sides involved. An integrated Political Framework Crisis Approach (PFCA) should include a thorough (and integrated) context analysis, already with a view to necessary and available capabilities, as this is a precondition for defining a feasible and viable exit strategy.

PARTNERSHIPS
To ensure an exit strategy that is in place contributes to a host country's long-term resilience, it should be coordinated with the activities of other actors in the field, including UN, OSCE, NATO, AU, etc.

Peace Mediation and Mediation Support

In the Civilian CSDP Compact, MS laid out their commitment to "Respond with speed and determination to particular situations throughout the **entire conflict cycle, with particular emphasis on stabilisation** as well as prevention…" (2018, p.4; emphasis added). As the German Federal Foreign Office notes in its Peace Mediation Framework, "mediation processes can serve as a starting point for additional stabilisation and support efforts".[30] Extending this logic to the EU level, peace mediation and mediation support activities should complement civilian CSDP missions and crisis management activities in general and vice versa. Indeed, the Concept on EU Peace Mediation states that "civilian CSDP missions, in particular, could also play a supporting role in peace monitoring and mediation, where relevant and according to their respective mandate".[31] The Pool of EU Peace Mediators, established in June 2020, promises to be a useful asset with regards to bolstering EU mediation, mediation support, and crisis management activities more broadly.[32]

CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Peace mediation and mediation support should be operationally included in the nature and scope of EU crisis management.

RESILIENCE
The ultimate goal of mediation and mediation support should be to strengthen the resilience of host countries. Thus, mediation and mediation support must be part of an integrated approach taking into account other EU activities (crisis management as well as development) under the overall goal of enhancing resilience.

CAPABILITIES
Mediation should be seen as a tool in the EU's crisis management toolbox, and thus as a capability to be utilised and developed. Mediation training should take place in an integrated manner since it often happens in (mixed) police, civilian, as well as military contexts, and mediators (no matter which track) ought to be aware of differences and commonalities between the groups and their ways of communicating and setting priorities. Moreover, peace mediation and mediation support may require additional capabilities to enable and support often complex and global arrangements in the peace process.

PARTNERSHIPS
The EU should continue to strive for partnerships, especially with the UN, in the realm of mediation. As noted in the Concept on EU Peace Mediation, "Joint mediation engagements based on joint situation assessments, as a modality suited for the mediation needs in the coming decade, should be further explored. Joint opportunities for sharing experiences and learning should be enhanced."[33] Partnerships should also be fostered

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[30] Federal Foreign Office (2019). *Peace Mediation Framework*, p. 2. https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2247136/a19a78d2e10cdca5401bf9f15c8931bf/peace-mediation-framework-data.pdf

[31] Council of the EU (Dec. 2020). *Concept on EU Peace Mediation*, p.12. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/st13951.en20.pdf

[32] Integrated Approach for Security and Peace Directorate (n.d.). *Mediation Factsheet.* https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/isp2_mediation_factsheet_for_publication_20022021.pdf

[33] ibid., p. 13

with national training providers, such as Germany's Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF). The latter recently conducted a training of twenty members of the EU Pool of Mediators.[34]

Article 28 Lisbon Treaty

Article 28[35] of the Lisbon Treaty could in some cases be used to enhance the security expertise of EU delegations, in countries where no CSDP mission is present. However, it should preferably not be understood or used as a more flexible alternative to CSDP missions, as it lacks the institutional and regulatory framework as well as political backing associated with CSDP. It should rather be understood as a support tool to CSDP and overall EU activities in third countries.

CAPABILITIES
Efforts under Art. 28 should be subject to a rigorous evaluation and a thorough lessons-learned process before possibly being broadened. This process would require capabilities to assess whether the approach of this Article could or should be systematised.

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[34] https://www.zif-berlin.org/en/news/en-eeas-pool-mediators-certificate-program
[35] "Where the international situation requires operational action by the Union, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their implementation. If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question subject to such a decision, the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that decision and take the necessary decisions." (Art. 28, TEU).