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# » The Internal - External Security Nexus «

*A contribution to a better understanding  
and operationalisation of cooperation  
between civilian CSDP and JHA*

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## **List of Acronyms and Abbreviations**

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AFSJ:	Area of Freedom Security and Justice
CFSP:	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CivCom:	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
COSI:	Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security
CoE:	European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management
CSAP:	Country Situational Awareness Platform
CSDP:	Common Security and Defence Policy
EEAS:	European External Action Service
IBM:	Integrated Border Management
JHA:	Justice and Home Affairs
MS:	Member States of the European Union
PSC:	Political and Security Committee
QMV:	Qualified Majority Voting
TEU:	Treaty on European Union
TFEU:	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

## **Glossary**

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External security:	Security outside the EU borders
Internal security:	Security both within the EU and within national borders
JHA:	All actors in the field of justice and home affairs, whether at the EU level (agencies such as Frontex, Europol, EASO, etc.) or at the national level (line ministries, police, border guard, etc.). Used interchangeably with the term Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) in this paper.
Strategic level:	Highest decision-making level deciding on general direction of policy
Operational level:	Middle decision-making level, relating to implementation of strategic decisions
Tactical level:	Day-to-day operations



## Executive Summary

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Over the past years, the nexus between internal and external security has become increasingly apparent, with threats, such as terrorism, hybrid- and cyber-attacks, organised crime, and climate change, evidencing the spill-over effects of events outside the EU's border on its internal security. In light of an awareness of the nexus, there have been efforts to improve the cooperation between the externally focused civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the internally focused Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).

This **paper** seeks to **contribute to an improved understanding and operationalisation of cooperation** between civilian CSDP and JHA and ultimately to a **more effective civilian CSDP**. It is based on sixteen expert interviews, two written contributions by Member States (MS), and a review of primary and secondary literature.

Following an overview of the state of play of the internal-external security nexus, both on the policy and operational level, the paper discusses the results from the interviews and written contributions in sections II-IV. Section II outlines that the interviewees **agreed on the broad definition** of the security nexus, but equally on the **need to move from the conceptual to the operational level**.

Section III argues that the term 'CSDP-JHA cooperation' can refer to a **variety of cooperative formats**, including regular communication, CSDP missions functioning as 'gateways' for JHA actors' engagement in the field, deploying JHA experts to missions, and joint situational awareness. As

noted in this section, there was **disagreement** with regards to whether **internal security is a legitimate goal of CSDP missions**, with some interviewees highlighting the **risks involved in CSDP becoming an instrument for JHA**. Additionally, this section discusses that most interviewees suggested MS should take the lead in operationalising CSDP-JHA cooperation.

Section IV outlines **obstacles to such operationalisation**, namely the distinct legal bases of the two domains, a lack in understanding of the nexus, mainly on the tactical level, the fact that the two domains continue to largely operate in silos, and obstacles to secondment of JHA experts to CSDP missions.

The paper concludes by providing **four policy recommendations**: first, to **improve the institutionalisation** of CSDP-JHA cooperation on the national, Brussels, and mission level; second, to **foster cooperation between the two domains** in the spirit of the EU's Integrated Approach, while **respecting the distinct mandates and goals** of CSDP and JHA; third, to utilise **strategic communication to foster understanding** of the internal-external security nexus at all levels; fourth, to **strengthen the role of missions** in contributing to the improvement of CSDP-JHA cooperation, and thus of civilian CSDP. These recommendations – and the analysis underlying them – will hopefully contribute to tapping into the potential for CSDP that lies in CSDP-JHA cooperation, while at the same time avoiding important risks.



## ***I. Introduction: the Internal-External Security Nexus Over Time***

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The notion of the internal-external security nexus is not static but rather has evolved over time and reflects different meanings and security contexts. The evolution of the concept can be observed both in key policy texts as well as operationally.

On the policy level, even prior to the first deployment of a CSDP mission in 2003, the 9/11 terrorist attacks dramatically highlighted the interlinkages between external and internal security.<sup>1</sup> The 2003 European Security Strategy reflected this awareness, noting that “[t]he post-Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked”.<sup>2</sup> The terror attacks in Madrid in 2003 and London in 2005 underlined this fact. Subsequent strategies reflected the notion of the internal-external security nexus, including the 2005 EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the 2005 Strategy for the External Dimension of the Area JHA, and the 2010 Internal Security Strategy. These strategies are indicative of a growth in the external dimension of JHA,<sup>3</sup> as well as a move towards increasing cooperation between CSDP and JHA – two related, yet distinct, dimensions of the internal-external security nexus.

Regarding the latter dimension, in early 2011, the European Parliament’s Report on the Development of the Common Security and Defence Policy noted that “internal and external aspects of EU security should be treated as complementary dimensions of the same strategy”.<sup>4</sup> In 2016, following the 2015 migration and refugee crisis, the EU Global Strategy furthered this process of alignment between European foreign and security policy and the internal security interests of MS, rendering the protection of the EU and its citizens a

top priority of European crisis management abroad.<sup>5</sup> Finally, the 2018 Civilian CSDP Compact highlights the need for cooperation between the JHA and CSDP spheres in Commitments 20 and 21.

Though developments have been slower at the operational level – specifically with regards to CSDP-JHA cooperation<sup>6</sup> – the internal-external security nexus is nevertheless playing an increasingly important role. In Brussels, meetings between COSI and PSC, as well as COSI Support Group and CivCom are a step towards improved coordination.<sup>7</sup> At the mission level, the mandates of CSDP missions evidence the growing influence of internal security concerns on CSDP,<sup>8</sup> having increasingly shifted away from democratisation and the Feira priorities<sup>9</sup> and towards stabilisation and migration control.<sup>10</sup> According to Roderick Parkes, CSDP missions “are now focusing on the EU’s most pressing domestic interests [...] hold back criminals and migrants in North Africa, and operate at the very borders of the EU in the Central Mediterranean”.<sup>11</sup> The mandate of the EUCAP Sahel Niger mission, for example, was initially (2012) focused on supporting Niger in tackling terrorism, and in 2016, addressing irregular migration was added and a field office in Agadez opened to this end.<sup>12</sup>

Simultaneously, JHA agencies have become increasingly active outside the EU’s borders. The 2019 Frontex regulation enables the agency to work with countries that do not have a direct border with the EU, highlighting Frontex’s increasingly active involvement in the external domain.<sup>13</sup> Similarly, “Europol has sent police experts to Libya” and “Eurojust has concluded multiple arrangements to share evidence with foreign prosecu-

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<sup>1</sup> Ioannides and Collantes-Celador (2011)

<sup>2</sup> Council of the EU (2003), p. 4

<sup>3</sup> Ioannides (2013)

<sup>4</sup> European Parliament (2011), p. 12

<sup>5</sup> Pietz (2018)

<sup>6</sup> One exception is the 2005 cooperation agreement between Europol and the Council Secretariat on sharing information on CSDP

<sup>7</sup> Interviews 6, 10, 16, and written contribution 2

<sup>8</sup> Pietz (2018); Pirozzi (2018); Tardy (2018)

<sup>9</sup> The Feira priorities are police, the rule of law, civilian administration, and civil protection; Council of the EU (2000)

<sup>10</sup> Interviews 2 and 3

<sup>11</sup> Parkes (2020), p. 101

<sup>12</sup> Interview 12; Tardy (2018)

<sup>13</sup> Interviews 2 and 16



tors.”<sup>14</sup> In terms of CSDP-JHA cooperation, the developments have been slower. Indeed, still in 2014 the idea of Frontex supporting a CSDP mission in the Mediterranean was tabu.<sup>15</sup> Since then, Frontex and Europol have signed working arrangements with Operation SOPHIA in July 2018 – as part of the Crime Information Cell<sup>16</sup> pilot – and Frontex with Operation IRINI in January 2021. Currently, Frontex and EUCAP Sahel Niger are in the process of negotiating a working arrangement. This arrangement will 1) ensure close cooperation and communication between the two sides; 2) offer Frontex’s Integrated Border Management (IBM) expertise to the mission for specific trainings; 3) enable a common risk analysis.<sup>17</sup> Frontex is also planning on negotiating a working arrangement with EUBAM Libya and EUBAM Ukraine.

Its overarching goal being the improvement of civilian CSDP, this paper seeks to contribute to the operationalisation of the internal-external security nexus, focusing on the cooperation between

civilian CSDP and JHA actors (hereafter referred to as CSDP-JHA cooperation).<sup>18</sup> The paper does so by shedding light on the different understandings of the nexus, how these understandings are operationally translated, and what obstacles remain for cooperation between the CSDP and JHA fields.

To produce operationally relevant findings, the author conducted sixteen semi-structured expert interviews and received two written contributions from Member States (MS) that were not able to conduct an interview. The interviews lasted around half an hour each and were conducted via video conferencing tools between August and October 2021. The interviewees<sup>19</sup> came from the internal and foreign ministries of EU MS, the EEAS, European Commission, CSDP missions, the JHA agencies Frontex and Europol, and think tanks. A literature review of secondary sources complemented the findings from the interviews and written contributions.

## II. Conceptualising the Internal-External Security Nexus

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Key take-aways:

- Interviewees agreed on the broad definition of the security nexus, highlighting the interwoven nature of internal and external security, as well as the transnational dimension of current threats.
- Interviewees highlighted the need to move towards an operationalisation of the nexus.

On a conceptual level, all interviewees<sup>20</sup> offered a similar definition of the security nexus, pointing to the interwoven nature of internal and external security and the spill-over effects of events outside the EU’s borders on the EU’s internal<sup>21</sup> security. Going further, some interviewees suggested that

the distinction between internal and external security can only be drawn on paper, i.e., that security is indivisible.<sup>22</sup> Rather, the distinction into internal and external is an institutional one. On the EU level Commission Directorates General, such as DG HOME and DG JUST, are responsible for

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<sup>14</sup> Parkes (2020), p. 101

<sup>15</sup> Interview 2

<sup>16</sup> The Crime Information Cell was launched in July 2018 and consisted of specialists from Frontex, Europol, and EUNAVFOR Med SOPHIA

<sup>17</sup> Interview 12

<sup>18</sup> See glossary for a definition of key terms, in terms of how they are used in this paper

<sup>19</sup> List of interviews can be found in annex 1

<sup>20</sup> Hereafter, “interviews/interviewees” also includes the two written contributions

<sup>21</sup> When speaking about “internal security” the interviewees in general referred both to security within the EU’s border and within the borders of individual MS

<sup>22</sup> Interviews 7 and 9



internal affairs, and the EEAS for external affairs; at the national level, line ministries, such as ministries of interior/administration, justice, and finance, are responsible for internal, and ministries of foreign affairs, defence, etc., for external affairs.<sup>23</sup>

Others suggested that it is the nature of current threats that increasingly challenges the traditional security paradigm and blurs the lines between the two security domains.<sup>24</sup> In line with this, it was pointed out that all top seven threats listed in Europol's 2021 Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) report have an external dimension.<sup>25</sup> Further, most interviewees highlighted that in recent years, threats have increasingly acquired a transnational dimension, with most commonly cited examples being hybrid and cyber threats, radicalisation and terrorism, irregular

migration, organised crime, and climate change. With reference to the crisis at the Polish-Belarusian border, interviewees also highlighted the weaponisation of migration.<sup>26</sup>

While interviewees generally agreed on their definition of the security nexus in general terms, they also raised the risk of remaining stuck at the conceptualisation phase<sup>27</sup> and pointed to the need to translate the definition of the nexus into practice.<sup>28</sup> One interviewee in particular stressed the insufficient focus on operationalising existing policies.<sup>29</sup> Part of the problem might be the lack of an overarching strategy for cooperation between the two realms.<sup>30</sup> But it is also likely to be due to the many different ways in which the nexus – and CSDP-JHA cooperation specifically – can be operationalised. The following section elaborates on this.

### III. Operationalising CSDP-JHA Cooperation

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Key take-aways:

- 'CSDP-JHA cooperation' refers to several cooperative formats, varying in intensity of cooperation.
- Four categories of cooperation are identified: regular communication; joint situational awareness; CSDP missions as 'springboards' for JHA; deployment of JHA experts to missions.
- Interviewees disagreed as to whether ensuring internal EU security should serve as a *raison d'être* of CSDP missions. There exists a risk of missions becoming a JHA tool.
- MS should take the lead in operationalising CSDP-JHA cooperation.

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#### The 'How' – a Spectrum of Cooperative Formats

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A key finding from the interviews was that the term 'CSDP-JHA cooperation' is used to refer to a variety of types of cooperation, depending on which format the person at-hand sees as most

useful or is most aware about. Thus, the first step in operationalising the internal-external security nexus, and CSDP-JHA cooperation specifically, is to acknowledge this variety of cooperative formats

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<sup>23</sup> Interviews 7, 9, and written contribution 1

<sup>24</sup> Interviews 5 and 10

<sup>25</sup> Interview 14

<sup>26</sup> Interviews 1 and 15

<sup>27</sup> Interview 4

<sup>28</sup> Interviews 3, 6, 7, and 12

<sup>29</sup> Interview 12

<sup>30</sup> Interview 14



and to be precise when discussing them. The different forms of cooperation can be visualised on a spectrum, moving from least to most cooperation (Figure 1). Four main categories of cooperation can be identified.

First, cooperation can take the form of establishing consistent communication channels that ensure complementarity of actions in the field. Here, breaking out of “pillar thinking” and fostering synergies is advocated for.<sup>31</sup> On the one hand, this is important to address root causes of issues, such as terrorism, in line with the EU’s Integrated Approach.<sup>32</sup> On the other hand, it is a pre-

condition for projecting a cohesive EU stance on the international stage, especially towards systemic rivals, such as China.<sup>33</sup> Complementarity is also important to avoid redundancies in the EU’s work abroad, given that thematic overlaps exist between the work of JHA agencies in the field and CSDP missions.<sup>34</sup> This is partly the rationale behind the negotiated working arrangement between Frontex and EUCAP Sahel Niger, as, until recently, little to no communication existed between both sides. Indeed, one interviewee recounted instances where both parties interacted with the same Nigerien stakeholder without knowledge of such interaction on the other side.<sup>35</sup>

Second, complementarity and the overcoming of pillar thinking can be ensured through information exchange, joint analyses, and situational awareness.<sup>36</sup> A relevant example is the Crime Information Cell created under the Operation SOPHIA,

though its successfulness has been debated.<sup>37</sup> Like clear communication, fostering complementarity in such a way is important to avoid parallel processes, thus increasing efficiency of the EU’s activities in host countries.




Figure 1. Visual depiction of different types of CSDP-JHA cooperation on a spectrum from least to most intensity of cooperation.

Third, CSDP missions can serve as ‘springboards’ or ‘gateways’ for JHA actors’ engagement with host countries and organisations.<sup>38</sup> In other words, CSDP missions can facilitate the establishment of strategic partnerships between JHA actors and host countries on the ground. The support offered by missions can be both physical (infrastructure) and non-physical (e.g., contacts, horizon scanning analyses, context assessments).<sup>39</sup> Needless to say, this should not constitute the main purpose of CSDP missions.<sup>40</sup>

Fourth, cooperation can take – and has already taken – the form of utilising JHA expertise to improve the work of CSDP missions. This type of cooperation was most cited.<sup>41</sup> The rationale is that to successfully fulfil their mandates, CSDP missions require law enforcement and other JHA-related expertise, including on organised crime, rule of

<sup>31</sup> Interviews 8, 12, and 15

<sup>32</sup> Interview 15

<sup>33</sup> Interview 8

<sup>34</sup> Interviews 8 and 12

<sup>35</sup> Interview 12

<sup>36</sup> Interviews 8 and 12

<sup>37</sup> Koutrakos (2018)

<sup>38</sup> Interviews 11 and 14 and written contribution 1

<sup>39</sup> Interview 14

<sup>40</sup> Interview 11

<sup>41</sup> Interviews 6, 7, 11, 12, 14, written contribution 2



law, cyber threats, penitentiary, counterterrorism, and border management. Thus, JHA experts can be 'embedded' in CSDP missions. There seemed to be different views among the interviewees with regards to the specific meaning of the term 'JHA expert'. While some interviewees used this term to refer to experts from JHA agencies only,<sup>42</sup> others meant both experts from the agencies and from MS' line ministries.<sup>43</sup> A related differentiation pertains to that between active experts – those working in line ministries – and non-active experts, working in JHA agencies. Both add a distinct value to missions, with the former having likely faced similar issues in their national contexts as in missions, while the latter could offer useful expertise of specific topics, such as community policing.<sup>44</sup> The deployment of JHA experts in missions may be in the form of a short-term 'borrowing' of experts – for example through the 'visiting experts' framework – with a view to specific

projects. An example of this is the Frontex-EUCAP Sahel Niger upcoming working arrangement, which could involve Frontex officers support the mission in specific trainings for a period of six to eight weeks.<sup>45</sup> Embedment can also occur more long-term through formal secondment of JHA experts to CSDP missions, as is already occurring with regards to experts from MS' line ministries.

As the four points above show, there are several cooperative formats. Which type of cooperation is chosen, and how it is executed (e.g., in terms of the underlying goal of embedding JHA experts in CSDP missions) depends on several factors, including availability of staff and resources. But perhaps the most fundamental factor is what one considers to be the ultimate purpose of a CSDP mission. It is on this fundamental aspect that interviewees' opinions seemed to differ, as the following section details

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### The 'What If' - the Risk of CSDP Becoming a JHA Tool

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On the one hand, several interviewees argued that ensuring the EU's internal security is a legitimate objective of a CSDP mission and that the potential of missions as instruments for the EU's internal security could be better exploited.<sup>46</sup> According to these interviews, the prevention and stabilisation of crises in third countries should not be a goal in itself and the mandates of missions should more prominently reflect internal security interests from the JHA side. On the other hand, interviewees argued that, despite CSDP missions' potential positive spill-over effect on internal EU security, the purpose of such missions is distinctly separate from that of JHA actors.<sup>47</sup> In other words, according to these interviewees, CSDP should by no means become a tool for JHA. The problem of these diametrically opposed views on the

relationship between JHA and CSDP, including the purpose of CSDP missions, should be solved to allow for fruitful cooperation in the future.

It is worth underlining the differentiation between (i) the external dimension of JHA, in other words the need for JHA actors to work with third countries to achieve internal security objectives, and (ii) the work of CSDP missions. The main goals, respectively, are ensuring internal security and effectively and sustainably managing crises for the purpose of preserving international peace and security (see Info Box on page 10). While there are notable positive spill-over effects on internal security by CSDP missions, and while these should be acknowledged and reflected in strategic communication, these should take a secondary role.<sup>48</sup> In

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<sup>42</sup> Interview 11

<sup>43</sup> Interviews 7 and 14

<sup>44</sup> Interview 14

<sup>45</sup> Interview 12

<sup>46</sup> Interviews 4, 9, and 14

<sup>47</sup> Interviews 8, 11, 12, and 15

<sup>48</sup> Interview 12



line with this, the main purpose of deploying JHA experts to missions should be the achievement of CSDP goals and mandates.


The risk of CSDP becoming a tool for, or even being replaced by, JHA is one that should be taken seriously. Roderick Parkes has predicted “that AFSJ agencies will simply displace CSDP deployments and become the EU’s prime instrument in this field of governance support at home and abroad” and “wonders if this is such a bad thing”.<sup>49</sup> Avoiding CSDP becoming a tool for JHA is important for three reasons.

First, CSDP and JHA have distinct legal bases (see Info Box, p. 10),<sup>50</sup> and thus have different objectives and mandates.<sup>51</sup> Indeed, the European Court of Justice, in a judgement of 19 July 2012, held that AFSJ (subsumed under the term JHA in this paper) and CFSP (thus also CSDP) “pursue objectives which, although complementary, do not have the same scope”<sup>52</sup> and that preserving “**international peace and security**” (emphasis added; SM) constitutes the objective of the EU’s external action.<sup>53</sup>

Second, a CSDP mission that has internal EU security objectives as its main goal and rationale risks not being successful in the long term.<sup>54</sup> A mission that predominantly and narrowly aims to ensure the EU’s security is unlikely to garner much support from the host country and society. Local support and ownership, however, are key in achieving sustainable results that outlast a mission’s lifetime. CSDP missions should aim to bolster societal resilience by shifting their focus away from a narrow conception of security and domestic (EU) security needs and towards “the strengthening of state institutions and the establishment of accountable and effective police, border police and judiciary systems”.<sup>55</sup>

Third, CSDP missions offer a unique opportunity for the EU to prove itself as a normative and

transformative power on the international stage. Several commentators have suggested that the EU is increasingly prioritising internal security imperatives over the adherence to international human rights law. Commenting on Operation SOPHIA Koutrakos questions “whether the ultimate protection of fundamental human rights is secondary to the central aim of Operation SOPHIA, namely, to buttress the EU from the current influx of migrants”.<sup>56</sup> If such an impression would persist and become more common, this would greatly damage the perception of the EU as a union of values and norms.



<sup>49</sup> Parkes (2020), p. 98

<sup>50</sup> Interviews 8, 9, 11, and 14

<sup>51</sup> Interviews 12 and 15

<sup>52</sup> European Court of Justice (2012), paragraph 66

<sup>53</sup> European Court of Justice (2012), paragraph 61

<sup>54</sup> Interview 12

<sup>55</sup> Ioannides and Collantes-Celador (2011), p. 416

<sup>56</sup> Koutrakos (2018), p. 305



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## The 'Who' – Whose Responsibility to Operationalise?

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When asked who should take the lead in operationalising CSDP-JHA cooperation, most interviewees agreed that MS should take the lead given that CSDP is in their remit.<sup>57</sup> MS should ensure cooperation is well-functioning on the national level as this is a precondition for cooperation at EU level. At the latter, it was suggested that the EU should work towards deepening cooperation within the institutions, especially between DG HOME and the EEAS. Moreover, it should have a coordinating function across EU structures and MS, streamlining the approach of all actors involved and promoting dialogue.<sup>58</sup> The importance of the Council Presidency in driving cooperation between CSDP and JHA forward was also highlighted.<sup>59</sup>

Of note, almost none of the interviewees mentioned CSDP missions as key actors in the operationalisation of the nexus. When asked about them explicitly, interviewees generally pointed to missions' role as instruments for implementing CSDP policy on the ground. The two interviewees that pro-actively mentioned missions highlighted the latter's role in providing information on the knowledge and expertise needed based on the situation on the ground, thus facilitating the formulation of realistic and context-specific policy. The need for missions to have a bigger weight in providing feedback on the operationalisation of policies designed at Brussels level was made clear.<sup>60</sup>

### **IV. Obstacles to CSDP-JHA Cooperation**

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Key take-aways:

- Less awareness of the security nexus, including the benefits of CSDP missions for internal security, exists on the tactical levels, where secondment usually takes place.
- 'Ad-hocism', lack of ownership, and insufficient interest continue to mark the interactions between CSDP and JHA.
- Obstacles to secondment, both for JHA agencies and MS' line ministries, hamper deployment to missions.

All interviewees highlighted obstacles to CSDP-JHA cooperation. One commonly mentioned obstacle is the different legal bases of CSDP and JHA,<sup>61</sup> outlined in the Info Box on page 10. On the following page, three additional obstacles are elaborated on.

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<sup>57</sup> Interviews 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 14, written contribution 1

<sup>58</sup> Interviews 4, 5, and 10, written contribution 2

<sup>59</sup> Interviews 7, 8, and 16

<sup>60</sup> Interviews 6 and 12

<sup>61</sup> Interviews 2, 8, 9, 11, and 14



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## Lack of Common Understanding

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When asked whether a common understanding, and awareness, of the internal-external security nexus exists, many interviewees noted that it depends on the decision-making level in question: while, generally speaking, on the strategic and operational decision-making levels, an awareness of the added value (albeit indirect) of CSDP missions for internal security exists, this understanding is less prominent at the tactical level.<sup>62</sup> This is a critical problem, as it is often at this latter level that decisions on secondment are made.<sup>63</sup> One interviewee outlined a scenario where a police chief in a small town is likely to turn down an officer's application letter for secondment to a CSDP mission, due to being aware of the lack of personnel in the small town and unfamiliar with missions' work and added value for internal security.<sup>64,65</sup> Additionally, one interviewee underlined that a gap in understanding may also exist in federal republics, such as Germany, where a gap in understanding may exist between the federal and the state level decision-makers.<sup>66</sup>

Another dimension of this challenge is the lack of knowledge on CSDP, and the work of missions, among JHA experts.<sup>67</sup> This is partly due to the two domains continuing to largely operate in silos, as the next section elaborates on.

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## CSDP and JHA Continue to Operate in Silos

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Despite some concrete examples of CSDP-JHA cooperation in recent years, the two domains were described as operating without much systematic

and substantive interaction.<sup>68</sup> The cooperation is largely not systematic because much of it occurs in an ad-hoc manner, with working level contacts existing but remaining largely informal; it is not substantive because, generally speaking, JHA actors do not sense real ownership over relevant processes.<sup>69</sup> For example, the 'mini concepts' on protection of cultural heritage and on terrorism in the context of transnational crime landed on MFA colleagues' desks, while colleagues from the internal side were invited to provide comments without grasping the full context of the coming about of these mini concepts, leading to a lack of ownership.<sup>70</sup> One interviewee recounted a "general lack of interest" from the Commission and JHA agencies in fostering synergies with civilian CSDP missions. This was partly attributed to a lack of political push from MS, especially from the internal side.<sup>71</sup>

Overall, many interviewees<sup>72</sup> suggested that, generally speaking, there is an interest in fostering cooperation on the foreign policy side but that this is not reciprocated on the internal side, which considers foreign affairs of secondary, if not tertiary importance.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Interview 1, 2, 5, and 14

<sup>63</sup> Interview 14

<sup>64</sup> Interview 1

<sup>65</sup> Examples of good practices can be found in NL and DE: the Dutch National Police has a financial compensation within its budget, which allows for gaps in personnel to be filled temporarily until the seconded officer returns; DE has created a pool of additional police posts and personnel in this pool is assigned to Police Training Centre in Brühl, North-Rhein Westphalia, and can be deployed from there

<sup>66</sup> Interview 14

<sup>67</sup> Interviews 2 and 10

<sup>68</sup> Interviews 1, 5, 7, and 9

<sup>69</sup> Interview 1

<sup>70</sup> Interview 1

<sup>71</sup> Interview 5

<sup>72</sup> Interviews 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10

<sup>73</sup> Interview 9



## Obstacles to Secondment of Personnel

A key challenge is the mobilisation of sufficient JHA personnel – both from agencies and line ministries – for secondment to CSDP missions. With a view to agencies, such as Frontex and Europol, this is due to duty of care issues, budget issues, and a lack of sufficient personnel, among others.<sup>74</sup> With regards to personnel limits, one interviewee noted that if something happens in the Mediterranean and Frontex resources are needed, Frontex personnel can't be found training security forces, say,

in the Sahel.<sup>75</sup> With regards to line ministries, the problems are both of personnel shortage and of budgetary, regulatory, and legal obstacles to secondment, with some MS having no framework for secondment for Experts outside Public Service (EoPS).<sup>76</sup> Another issue relates to career path development, with some experts, such as police officers, finding it difficult to get back into national administration after being seconded to a CSDP mission. The problem hereby lies in the fact that the added value of secondment to a mission for work in a national context is insufficiently recognised.<sup>77</sup>

## V. Policy Recommendations




Figure 2. Visual depiction of four policy recommendations elaborated on in the paper.

<sup>74</sup> Interviews 11 and 16

<sup>75</sup> Interview 16

<sup>76</sup> Interview 10; The European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management (CoE) organised a workshop on this exact

topic. The key takeaways are available on the CoE's Knowledge Hub, accessible to CoE members.

<sup>77</sup> Interviews 9 and 16



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## 1. Improve institutionalisation of CSDP-JHA cooperation

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### Member State level

First, a **liaison officer from the JHA side** could facilitate dialogue and coordination between the foreign affairs and internal spheres. This would ultimately save time and effort and thus lower the hurdles for cooperation.

Second, **inter-ministerial working groups** could be created, involving actors working on foreign affairs, home affairs, finance, and other line ministries.<sup>78</sup>

### Member State and EU level

Third, **excellent preparation of joint CSDP-JHA meetings** is of key importance, with particular attention having to be paid to producing an agenda that is substantive and based on needs. Short and relevant background briefings should be sent out in advance and preparation of all attendees expected.

### EU level

Fourth, **JHA should be systematically involved in early planning of CSDP**. JHA actors should be involved at the earliest possible stage of decision-making processes, such as the strategic planning of CSDP missions. This involvement should not limit itself to consultation only but take the form of a full involvement in the process. Moreover, more structured and systemic forms of cooperation should be fostered between COSI and PSC, as well as their support groups. This would facilitate the alignment of political decisions with resources, especially JHA personnel. This is of critical importance given the growing gap between ambitions and resources of civilian CSDP missions.

### Mission level

Fifth, **to-be-seconded personnel from line ministries could complete a pre-mission preparation in JHA agencies**. This suggestion was made by an interviewed Frontex official, who suggested that personnel that is about to be seconded to a CSDP mission could spend a week at Frontex, for instance, to observe operational procedures and learn about IBM work in an international environment.

Sixth, **Country Situational Awareness Platforms (CSAPs) could be established**. As discussed in a European Commission working document of July 2016, the purpose of a CSAP is to foster information and knowledge exchange among all EU actors in a host country, with a focus on CSDP and JHA agencies. Under the initial conceptualisation, the Head of Delegation would lead the platform.<sup>79</sup>

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## 2. Foster cooperation under the Integrated Approach, while respecting the distinct objectives and mandates of CSDP and JHA

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Cooperation between CSDP and JHA actors should be fostered, given the added value of: JHA and CSDP actors acting cohesively in the spirit of the EU's Integrated Approach; utilising JHA expertise on, say, rule of law within CSDP missions; JHA actors using CSDP missions to develop strategic partnerships in the field; etc. Yet, it is key to **acknowledge the distinctly different mandates and objectives of CSDP and JHA**, and to enhance cooperation based on this acknowledgment.

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<sup>78</sup> Poland has created such a working group following the adoption of the Civilian CSDP Compact. It meets on an ad-hoc

basis, has a common email group and was described as a success by an interviewee (Interview 10)

<sup>79</sup> European Commission (2016)



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### 3. Utilise strategic communication to foster an understanding of the nexus

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Strategic communication is a **key enabler when it comes to achieving a change in thinking among actors responsible for the secondment** of JHA personnel. Decision-makers at the strategic and operational levels should use the tools at their disposal to distribute messages about the importance of the internal-external security nexus, including, for example, the strong external dimension of many internal security problems, to stakeholders on the tactical level.

Messages should be as tangible as possible and could take the form of first-hand accounts of previously seconded JHA personnel (see Recommendation 4). In general, it is advisable for MS to have a Communication Strategy. The Strategic Communication Model, produced by the CoE in collaboration with Cluster 3, provides a blueprint for such a strategy. It is available to CoE members on the Knowledge Hub.

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### 4. Strengthen the role of missions in contributing to the improvement of CSDP-JHA cooperation

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First, **personal anecdotes and stories from seconded JHA personnel could feed strategic communication in MS**. The latter could help address the lack of understanding and awareness of CSDP, including its added value for internal security, among actors on the tactical and operational level in MS. The 'Faces of CSDP' paper, produced by the CoE in collaboration with Cluster 3, provides guidance with regards to this endeavour. It is available to CoE members on the Knowledge Hub.

Second, **improved feedback-loops from missions on policies designed at Brussels and MS level could be established**. Feedback from CSDP missions that practically cooperate with JHA actors, such as EUCAP Sahel Niger, could be used to assess and, if needed, re-evaluate, existing policies at Brussels and national level.

In this way, missions could play a greater role in the improvement of CSDP-JHA cooperation, and ultimately of civilian CSDP.



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## **Annex 1. List of Interviews & Written Contributions**

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### **Interviews conducted via video call between August and October 2021**

Interview 1: Crisis management expert at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of an EU Member State, 11/08/2021

Interview 2: Expert on foreign police missions from a national police academy, 19/08/2021

Interview 3: Senior official working on international affairs at the Ministry of Interior of an EU Member State, 24/08/2021

Interview 4: Expert working on CSDP at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of an EU Member State, 24/08/2021

Interview 5: Senior EEAS official working with CSDP, 24/08/2021

Interview 6: Senior official working on European security policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of an EU Member State, 27/08/2021

Interview 7: Advisor working on crisis management at the Ministry of Justice of an EU Member State, 01/09/2021

Interview 8: Senior official working on CSDP at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of an EU Member State, 06/09/2021

Interview 9: Official at DG HOME working on international affairs, 08/09/2021

Interview 10: Senior official working on CSDP at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of an EU Member State, 29/09/2021

Interview 11: CivCom Delegate from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of an EU Member State, 30/09/2021

Interview 12: Senior official working in a CSDP mission, 30/09/2021

Interview 13: Europol official, 30/09/2021

Interview 14: Official working on international matters at the Ministry of Interior of an EU Member State, 11/10/2021

Interview 15: Expert working at the German Council on Foreign Relations, 11/10/2021

Interview 16: Frontex official, 18/10/2021

### **Written contributions received instead of interviews**

Written contribution 1: Ministry of Interior of an EU Member State, received 23/09/2021

Written contribution 2: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Interior of an EU Member State, received 13/10/2021



For comments or queries, please contact:

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