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


Strengthening civilian CSDP through enhanced application of the EU's Integrated Approach

Baseline Document for the CoE's
Civilian CSDP Summer Forum
4-5 June 2024

The Civilian CSDP Summer Forum is organised by the European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management and takes place under the auspices of the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

The baseline document provides an overview of the different actors involved in the EU Integrated Approach, illustrates good practices and current challenges at all levels of integration and offers food for thought for areas of improvement in the application of the Integrated Approach. This document argues that a successful implementation of the Integrated Approach can only be realised if all sides of below triangle – the national (Member States), the EU (institutions and services), and the actors in theatre (missions and other stakeholders on the ground) – work towards strengthening coordination and cooperation of the different actors involved under the umbrella of a joint strategic and operational framework.



Introduction

Significant progress has been made since the EU's Integrated Approach to crises and conflicts was set out in the [2016 EU Global Strategy](#). Political Frameworks for a Crisis Approach (PFCA) as well as new tools, such as the Stabilisation Concept, have strengthened the framing of EU action, and reinforced coordination across instruments, rapid response measures, bilateral Member States' support and long-term reconstruction support.

What is the Integrated Approach?

The Integrated Approach to external conflicts and crises guides EU action at all stages of the conflict cycle (multi-phased) through the use of a wide range of instruments such as resources of civilian, military and police security forces, diplomacy and development cooperation (multi-dimensional).¹ This includes coordinating funding across actors and optimising their use by pooling, sharing and dividing tasks (multi-dimensional), addressing challenges at the national, regional, international, and local level (multi-level).² The Integrated Approach as such does not prejudge which instrument suits best for any given crisis but should be spelled out based on the situation on the ground in relation to any given crisis or conflict. It seeks to match the best suited tools to the conflict or crisis context, addressing drivers of conflict and taking account of local dynamics.

The [Strategic Compass of 2022](#) stresses the urgent need to redouble efforts to implement the Integrated Approach³, in particular following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and a multitude of (further) security threats against the Union.

The Integrated Approach lays an emphasis on an enhanced integration and coordination of different actors involved. Concrete steps for the implementation of the Integrated Approach have been further fleshed out in the 2017 EEAS working document "The EU Integrated Approach to external conflicts and crises".⁴

Since its introduction, the Integrated Approach has at times been presented as if it were already well established, so to say "a given" among the EU and its Member States' foreign policy action.⁵ Still, recent developments such as the return of Taliban administration in Afghanistan, the unforeseen expulsion of the EU mission from Niger, as well as challenges the EU mission in Mali is facing have demonstrated the challenges that surround the successful application of the Integrated Approach as a key element of EU external action.

These developments, against the backdrop of a multitude of current crises and conflicts worldwide, illustrate the need to sharpen Europe's "performance" as a force that stands for peace and security in the world – inter alia through the application of the Integrated Approach. With a view to the current challenges, a more effective application of the EU instruments in a coordinated manner at all stages of the conflict cycle is necessary. Moreover, bolstering coherence in the application of the approach can only be done if all sides of the triangle – the national, the EU and the in-theatre-level – engage jointly with a shared understanding of the conflict or crisis, its drivers, and a shared vision for a strategic framework. If coordination between the three sides of the triangle is essential for the

¹ European External Action Service, 2016, p. 28.

² Faleg, 2018, p. 3.

³ Council of the European Union, 2022, p. 12.

⁴ European External Action Service (b), 2016.

⁵ Tardy, 2017, p. 3.

successful application of the Integrated Approach, the same can be said about coordination within the three sides of the triangle.

The EU Integrated Approach at the national level

Ensuring an Integrated Approach is a national concern, since Member States often act bilaterally in the same context as EU instruments and have the same interest in ensuring that actions are coherent and address underlying drivers of conflict. In addition, Member States play an essential role in the application of the Integrated Approach, both as part of civilian CSDP efforts and through bilateral support to the host country in question.

Strengthening national coordination mechanisms to secure resources for civilian CSDP

The ability of Member States to contribute to crisis and conflict in an integrated manner also depends on strengthening their national civilian capabilities, i.e., improved systems and structures that shall facilitate increasing available resources for civilian crisis management (e.g., personnel, equipment, training, exercise support, financial contributions, in line with Deliverable 13 of the [Civilian CSDP Compact](#)). Since there is often a lack of alignment among national ministries regarding consistent EU policy development and implementation, coming to terms with an agreed and coordinated goal-setting in the field remains a challenge. Long-term strategic planning can only take place if the relevant national actors align and coordinate foreign policy action and goals.

The implementation of the Integrated Approach at the national level within EU Member States is essential for the overall successful application of the Integrated Approach in the field, since solid national coordination mechanisms ease the securing and effective use of resources for civilian CSDP missions, thus improving EU action in the field. Furthermore, internal coordination can help ensure the coherence of different strands of Member State actions, including humanitarian, development, and security related support.

Relevant coordination bodies and good practices of national coordination

Examples of configurations where Member States can ensure increased national coordination include inter-ministerial working groups, informal consultative bodies as well as national training providers.

Regarding concrete examples for national coordination, many Member States already have inter-institutional coordination groups in place to systematise integrated action related to civilian CSDP.

Below, please find a few examples of national coordination mechanisms:

Belgium

A good example for inter-ministerial Member State coordination is the Belgian PolCiv coordination meeting; a monthly meeting chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) together with the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), Federal Police, Ministry of Interior (MoI), Ministry of Defence (MoD), Ministry of Finance (MoF) as well as the Egmont Institute (Royal Institute for International Relations) responsible for Training. This body serves as a platform for decisions and exchange of information on subjects related to EU civilian CSDP missions, on the Belgian budget for secondments of experts, as well as the national capability development.

Germany

A similar platform for coordination is the German “LORBE” (“länderoffene Ressortbesprechung”), a meeting configuration consisting of relevant federal ministries (MFA, MoI, MoF, MoD), the Federal Police as well as ministries of the interior of the “Länder” (Germany’s federal states) and police services from the Länder. The German Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) and the European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management (CoE) take part in the meetings as special facilitating guests. The LORBE is not a decision-making body per se but rather a coordination committee to exchange on and streamline civilian CSDP operations with regards to the German NIP. This body has potential in the future to not only coordinate activities related to civilian CSDP but also to become a policy shaping entity contributing to a stronger Integrated Approach within Germany.

Sweden

Sweden has a coordination structure which is organised under the “Swedish Interagency council on Peace Operations (SICPO)” to align strategic positions of different national seconding agencies that concern civilian CSDP, but also other international organisations (the UN, the OSCE and NATO).⁶ Moreover, it uses several technical bodies to discuss and coordinate seconded positions, training, security and safety, the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda and Security Sector Reform (SSR) to ensure a coherent Team Sweden approach. In situations of deteriorating security in a mission, coordination with involved seconding agencies and ministries takes place.⁷

⁶ This is valid not only for Sweden but arguably for all EU Member States who do not have systems and structures in place that exclusively cater to EU civilian CSDP, but to other international organisations such as the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, NATO, and others as well. Thus, it is worth exploring how these structures and systems can be integrated even further, i.e., beyond civilian CSDP.

⁷ Lessons learned from the Covid-19 pandemic are yet to be fully implemented. Additional clarity delineating responsibilities (incl. duty of care) for seconded staff members (CivOpsCdr, HoM or seconding agency) should be in place.

The Netherlands

Another good example of national coordination comes from the Netherlands, where the MFA administers the secondments and respective mission pool, but different ministries such as the MoD and MoJ contribute to the overall coordination of secondments.

Strengthening key national capabilities, such as enhanced civil-military coordination, aligned strategic communication of national ministries, and strengthened knowledge management can strengthen the capacity to engage under an Integrated Approach. Moreover, better information sharing among relevant stakeholders in general, closer cooperation between national actors in the field of civilian CSDP and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) sector as well as stronger coordination amongst national training providers is essential. Regarding the latter, Germany's [Training Partner Platform](#) (TPP) is a good start when it comes to pooling and sharing of resources by bringing together different national training providers active in the field of crisis management.

Reinforced information sharing and coordination within a Member State will strengthen the capacity to engage in effective foreign policy action by ensuring coherent and well-coordinated national positions for instance in council working groups, information sharing with partners and allies as well as coordination in the field as part of an overall "Team Europe".

The Integrated Approach at the level of European Union institutions and services

The EEAS works actively to operationalise the Integrated Approach. Recent action points include Deliverables 5c, 7, and 19 in the Civilian CSDP Compact of 2023.⁸ The thematic priorities in the commitments are on knowledge management, reinforced coordination among all relevant actors, regular reporting on the application of the Integrated Approach and the engagement of local institutions in host countries.

Regarding the implementation of the Integrated Approach, the relevant actors within the EEAS are the Security and Defence Policy (SecDefPol) and Peace, Partnerships and Crisis Management Directorates (PCMD) and Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). PCM has a key role to play as the coordinating body for the Integrated Approach and the coordination hub for the EU conflict-cycle-responses.

From the EU Commission's side, bodies such as the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA), the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), DG Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME), DG for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) and DG Justice and Consumers (DG Just) along with Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) agencies like the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), European Union Agency for Law

⁸ Council of the European Union (b), 2023.

Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), are pivotal in fostering an Integrated Approach. Especially DG INTPA plays a key role in promoting the related Humanitarian – Development – Peace nexus and is an important EU actor in many of the host countries where CSDP missions operate.

A multitude of meeting configurations – and the need for more strategic coordination

Regarding CFSP/CSDP policies, strategic guidance is provided by the Political and Security Council (PSC). The Committee for Civilian Aspects for Crisis Management (CIVCOM) is the preparatory body for civilian CSDP. There are of course also other Council Working Groups and Bodies, that are of importance for the furthering of the Integrated Approach. Some of them are thematic working groups such as the Security Sector Reform (SSR) Task Force, the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) task force, the inter-service consultation groups, or the working group on the protection of cultural heritage, while some are geography-based.⁹

Looking more broadly across the EU Institutions, there are a few examples of Integrated Approach coordination platforms. One of those is the Regional Integrated Approach Coordination meetings (RIACs) organised by PCM.¹ The RIACs are pivotal meetings bringing together numerous EU actors such as the EEAS, Commission services, EU delegations, CSDP missions and operations, and the EU Special Representatives (EUSR) to strengthen the EU cohesion and coordinate responses in the case of a crisis or conflict, as well as with an eye towards preventing conflicts. However, this platform has a geographical rather than a topical focus. Also, it is still an internal forum that would need to be expanded and connected to a broader political discussion to become fully effective in the coordination of EU actors and actions, thus implementing the Integrated Approach.

A need for a jointly defined strategic framework

The wide range of actors and instruments involved in EU response to crisis and conflict makes it inherently difficult to achieve a cohesive strategic framework. This becomes apparent for instance in EEAS and EU Commission reporting to Council working groups where all the different EU actors have their own reporting channels and mechanisms without having all of them report to Member States jointly on their activities in partner country.

To address this, the EU Integrated Approach toolbox already foresees Political Frameworks for Crisis Approach (PFCA). These documents are developed by EEAS geographical divisions working closely with PCM, in consultation with the Commission and Member States, upon request from PSC (or the HR/VP) in response to crisis or conflict. The PFCA lays out a strategic analysis of the crisis situation and possible options for EU engagement.

⁹ Blockmans, Debuysere, 2019, p. 26.

However, more work needs to be done to ensure stronger cohesion in formulating goals and strategic objectives, and to bring perspectives of Member States more systematically on board in the formulation process, including their historical legacy in a given country. The 2022 Stabilisation Concept takes a significant step in this direction, with Member State participation embedded as a core element of the approach. Consultation with non-governmental organisations is also encouraged. Stabilisation assessments are likely to remain relatively limited in scope and number,

focusing on a small number of settings where there is a window of opportunity to transition out of crisis.

Another important feature of Stabilisation Assessments which is currently lacking under PFCAs is the requirement for regular monitoring to validate the relevance of the context analysis. While the various instruments deployed in any given theatre have their own review and reporting mechanisms, the EU currently lacks a mechanism for providing a comprehensive update on a given crisis or conflict context (i.e., the PFCA) to allow for adapting actions in dynamic contexts.

Using this more inclusive approach more widely for PFCAs may prove challenging as this risks making this process more complex and time consuming, but it would contribute significantly to a more coherent, joined-up response.

Room for improved knowledge management and institutionalised mechanisms for reporting

A further area for potential improvement for the implementation of the Integrated Approach relates to the shortage of institutionalised reporting on the application of that Approach.

The Strategic Reviews of missions have made good headway towards a reporting which includes the perspectives of many actors, especially PCM.3 in liaison with the EEAS' geographical desks and other crisis management Directorates. However, room for improvement remains concerning a fixed methodology for setting up a Strategic Review.

While Strategic Reviews serve as a good example regarding the distribution and involvement of different actors, the sharing of relevant documents still often depends on personal relations, levels of trust, and knowledge between the relevant counterparts and other divisions. This bears the risk that important information and knowledge of good practices and challenges is lost between organisational structures. Aiming at a more structured reporting, the tasking to ensure regular reporting set out in the second Civilian CSDP Compact, anchored in PCM.1, should be fully implemented. Furthermore, it needs to be ensured that the sharing of information and documents is embedded in an agile knowledge management system, making important resources available on a longer-term basis for relevant stakeholders.

Lastly, once all EU actors have agreed on strategic objectives that are to be pursued jointly through the IA, these same actors should report back to Member States on how these objectives have been achieved. For instance, CSDP missions and operations, the Commission, JHA agencies, EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) could report regularly in PSC how the identified objectives have been met. This would create more joined ownership of these strategic objectives by all EU actors and promote accountability vis-à-vis the Member States. It would also allow the EU to be a more political and strategic actor instead of having dispersed EU actors all pursuing their different goals, with each of them reporting back through different mechanisms and Council Working Groups.

The Integrated Approach in the field

When it comes to the implementation of the EU Integrated Approach in the field, a wide range of tools and actors are present. The quantity of actors depends on the situation and related necessities on the ground as well as the actors' mandates, ranging from civilian CSDP missions and military CSDP operations, EU delegations (EUDEL) or EUSR, EU Commission (funded) projects, (national bilateral) development cooperation projects as well as experts from specialised agencies such as Frontex, Europol or Eurojust. On top of that, Member States might also fund projects administered directly by missions in their host countries.

In many cases, actors in the field pursue similar or even identical goals, while in others, approaches might differ quite significantly. An exchange about where and how deeply cooperation can take place – be it through information sharing, joint planning, pooled and shared resources (for instance sharing of equipment) is essential for a more cohesive and effective work on the ground. However, the challenge in aligning activities is that the coordination fora in place do not always meet regularly, or they depend on the goodwill of participating actors to make them happen.¹⁰ Also, different planning cycles and budget mechanisms make it at times difficult to have synergies between the different actors. When a multitude of actors are present on the ground, such as (but not limited to) Commission projects, civilian CSDP missions, as well as military CSDP operations, insufficient coordination and a lack of a mutually agreed understanding of the Integrated Approach can often contribute to the challenging situation the EU finds itself in.

In some cases, good cooperation in the field depends too much on interpersonal relations, most importantly whether the Head of Mission and the Head of Delegation get along well with one another.

Whenever structured cooperation is lacking, it is an impediment to the development and implementation of a coherent EU strategy in the field. Existing approaches such as missions

¹⁰ Some, but not all missions have dedicated personnel tasked specifically with coordination. Coordination cells are no longer part of the Model Structure for civilian CSDP missions. Deliverance of coordination is now almost exclusively upon the DHoM. It might be worth reconsidering whether this is a sustainable approach.

having dedicated personnel tasked specifically with coordination need to be strengthened to allow for a more Integrated Approach that makes EU engagement in the field more effective and efficient.¹¹

To make the Integrated Approach truly operational on the ground, two points are especially relevant: Firstly, a shared political analysis of local conditions and mutual interests is a prerequisite for joint, strategic action and "pulling in the same direction". Secondly, different actors and projects might have different mandates, however given that they operate in the same mission environment and country context, exploring – and coming to terms with mutual overlaps in mandates and fields for cooperation – is a crucial precondition for integrated action.

Conclusion and food for thought

This baseline document illustrates that the Integrated Approach can only become fully operational if the national, EU and field level all engage in its implementation by means of corporation and coordination. While the Member States' priorities should be on strengthening national coordination mechanisms (both at the policy and the operational levels) to secure resources for civilian CSDP, there is room for creating a more cohesive strategic framework as well as for improving mechanisms for institutionalised reporting and knowledge management on the side of the EU institutions and services. With a view to the Integrated Approach in the field, enhancing synergies and coordination between the different actors present on the ground is crucial to do more and – to put it simply – do better in terms of civilian crisis management through application of the Integrated Approach.

Evaluating the degree of implementation of the Integrated Approach as well as its effects remains a challenge due to the lack of benchmarks, be that quantitative or qualitative ones. Lessons (to be) learned processes on the application of this approach such as the evaluation of Western engagement in Afghanistan, began not long ago. Given that this paper suggests that the Integrated Approach needs to be implemented at all levels, we should also be thinking about how lessons (to be) learned processes can and should take into account the experiences from all sides of the triangle to account for the complexity of the topic.

Lastly, it should not be forgotten that not all steps to enhance the Integrated Approach need to be taken at the same time, but that there are many tangible steps (the proverbial low-hanging fruit) at each level to contribute to the common good. The Civilian CSDP Summer Forum 2024 will serve to identify concrete steps to improve the application of the Integrated Approach with the aim to bolster cohesion in the application of this approach as part of an overall "Team Europe".

¹¹ Here the UN might serve as an example with its Integrated Mission Training Centres (IMTC) that mirror corresponding structures at HQ.

Below, please find examples of current good practices in the application of the Integrated Approach as received from EUAM Ukraine and EUCAP Somalia:

Insights from EUAM Ukraine

The integrated approach cannot integrate by itself. It needs to be proactively constructed and implemented, but there are several challenges. There is no overarching body to ensure synchronization and explore synergies in implementation. The natural leader of an integrated approach, the national partner, may not have the capacity to initiate or head an integrated approach under the heavy strains of war. And the interests, objectives, and separate and often quite rigid processes of the different parties may not always be aligned or even conducive to an integrated approach.

The key challenge in building an integrated approach is to attain a state of play, where different partners within a given engagement area share information to provide an overall and joint situational picture; seek to align policies and objectives to achieve a greater joint effect and stronger results; and proactively coordinate to avoid overlaps and explore possible synergies in their respective engagements.

EUAM Ukraine proactively seeks to build an integrated approach with partners. Below are some examples of good practices, as well as observations with regard to the implementation of the integrated approach in the field.

EUAM supports the EU Delegation, EEAS, and the Commission in setting priorities and assessing progress in EU's political dialogue and sectoral dialogues with Ukraine on civilian security sector reform (CSSR).

EUAM meets regularly with the EU delegation to coordinate activities and discuss the state of play on civilian security sector reform. The Mission also joins a weekly VTC of EUDEL with EEAS and the Commission. Moreover, the Mission provides specialised reporting to the EU institutions, advises through its field offices on regional developments, and facilitates in visits to Ukraine from Brussels related to its mandate. The Mission will continue to advise on aspects of CSSR according to its mandate, and in cooperation with EUDEL and COM will support the accession related issues.

EUAM promotes coordination between the Mission, the EU Delegation, EU Member States and other international actors to support CSSR in Ukraine.

The Mission seeks to map donor activities of key partners in the field of CSSR, such as EU institutions, Member States, and other international partners. EUAM hosts regular coordination meetings on general issues of CSSR and takes the initiative as necessary to coordinate with all relevant parties on specific topics such as on the investigation and

prosecution of international crimes and on support to the liberated and adjacent territories. EUAM also participates in the regular donor coordination led by the EU delegation. The Mission continues to work closely with EU funded projects, which touch on areas of relevance to the Mission mandate, including the EU Anti-Corruption Initiative and EU support for public financial management, public administration reform, integrated border management, and justice sector reform.

EUAM exchanges expertise and advice with EU Member States and acts as implementer for Member State funding for CSSR.

The Mission utilizes member states experts as seconded advisors and as part of specialized teams and visiting experts (ST/VE) where there is a need to supplement in-house competences or significantly boost an area of engagement. EUAM has recently employed ST/VE when it comes to stabilization of liberated areas and on maritime integrated border management and security. The Mission also provides advice on an ad-hoc basis to Member State projects in the planning of their support to law enforcement agencies. Finally, the Mission progressively acts as an implementer of

projects funded by Member States to complement Mission advice, training, and support with the necessary equipment, systems, and mobile infrastructure solutions for partners to be able to carry out their functions. EUAM hopes to expand the scope for external funding in the future.

EUAM promotes structured cooperation with EU agencies and international organizations through formalized working arrangements.

The Mission is working closely with EU agencies to better coordinate and further expand efforts within the same areas of cooperation with Ukraine. EUAM has signed a working arrangement with Frontex on border management. The Mission also works closely with Eurojust, International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression, CEPOL, EUROPOL among others on a wide range of topics, including criminal justice, international crimes, and border management. The cooperation is also expanded to include EU Member States bordering Ukraine when it comes to border management, such as for instance with Romania in the opening additional Border Crossing Points. The Mission also works closely with international partners in the UN system, the Council of Europe, and the OSCE, and have concluded formalized working arrangements with several such partners.

Observations:

- *While information exchange and cooperation between the various parts of the EU family engaged in CSSR is good, there is scope for further strengthening these processes. EUAM can contribute Mission expertise and provide a framework for building a stronger integrated approach benefitting from the Mission's in-country size*

and scope and regional presence.

- *The Mission can provide significant added value in building a stronger integrated approach on specific topics where coordination is absent or fragmented and where EUAM has a substantial capacity, for instance on support to law enforcement agencies, on international crimes, and on support to the re-establishment of the Rule of Law and stability policing in the liberated territories.*
- *The Mission's mapping products are valuable inputs to the donor coordination process in various areas, such as on IBM, but are currently only shared on an ad-hoc basis. This could be more streamlined in the various processes and they could be adjusted in scope to meet broader needs and be made more broadly available to partners.*
- *ST/VE are an excellent way for EUAM to benefit from expertise in EU member states as a force multiplier to boost an engagement in a particular area over the short term while at the same time contributing to strengthening coordination with sending states.*
- *External funding for Mission projects under a "train and equip" model is a powerful tool to enhance the Mission's ability to complement training and advice with the necessary material support allowing Ukrainian partners to be able to actually accomplish their tasks while at the same time fostering closer links to the Member States and contributing to the realization of joint objectives in Ukraine.*
- *Strengthening CIVMIL cooperation and coordination under an integrated umbrella, especially in the liberated and adjacent territories and regarding tasks on international crimes and stability policing in these areas, is crucial in order to establish a clear delineation of responsibilities and effective coordination mechanisms on overlapping engagements.*

Insights from EUCAP Somalia

EUCAP Somalia is part of the EU's integrated approach to Somalia. It works in close cooperation with the Delegation of the European Union to Somalia (EUDEL), the European Special Representative for the Horn of Africa (EUSR HoA) and two other CSDP Missions, namely the counter-piracy focused EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA, and the military training mission EUTM Somalia.

TA consistent systematic model of engagement with Somali counterparts is needed to further boost the integrated approach and enhance the EU's strategic efficacy. The launch of the EU Joint Operational Roadmap by the EUDEL Somalia is the right steps in this direction. This roadmap dialogue entails fostering dialogue at the appropriate levels (both technical and political), aligning messaging, and further streamlining coordination efforts at both EU and mission levels.

While the overall cooperation and coordination across various levels is successful, challenges persist:

1. *Notably in efforts to deal with differences in CSDP missions' rotations. To overcome this challenge representatives of different missions already take part in each other's induction trainings. There is still room for improvement as fruitful collaboration often hinges on personal engagement, highlighting the importance of interpersonal dynamics in fostering effective coordination.*
2. *Another challenge is to keep synchronizing long-term planning cycles of DG INTPA programmes (7 years circle) with Mission mandate (2 years circle) and refocus more on the INTPA funding on the civilian security sector reform. INTPA programmes just partially go along EUCAP Somalia's mandate. In police development, much more investments in infrastructure, equipment and logistics are needed as there were invested in the past (Joint Police Programme I) and will be in the future (Joint Police Programme II). Build up a functioning Police Force requires a longstanding financial instrument, such as a Law and Order Trust Fund. The maritime security also needs further investments in infrastructure, equipment and logistics are. The European Peace Facility (EPF) provides financial support to EUCAP Somalia sister Mission, EUTM Somalia. This support will exceed 100 million EUR for infrastructure, equipment and logistics of the Somali infantry brigades. Civilian CSDP missions do not have similar instrument and, therefore, have to count on limited budgets of their project cells to finance the needs of the civilian security sector (police, rule of law, maritime security/ coast guard functions).*
3. *Despite the EU-Operational Roadmap and other coordination mechanism, there is a need for greater institutionalisation of successful practices to ensure continuity beyond individual personalities. Many platforms exist to discuss and tackle specific topics but there often is still no overarching exchange of information and approach to counterparts.*

Examples for the good implementation of the Integrated Approach:

1. *With EUTM, EUCAP signed a new Administrative Agreement in 2023 to give greater impetus to mutual cooperation and coordination with the aim of improving the support to the Somali Armed and Police Forces and to implement the respective missions' mandates. The strength of this agreement is that it forms the basis for future development and enhancement of cooperative relations between EUCAP and EUTM.*
2. *Another notable example of collaboration and coordination is the collaborative efforts regarding the Red Sea Programme and CRIMARIO project IORIS in which actors share information, provide joint trainings on the maritime domain awareness sand have a combined presence in international meetings.*
3. *An additional example is the constant information sharing with the EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA liaison officer, present in Mogadishu, and the quarterly meetings taking place between EUCAP and the Operation Headquarters in Rota.*

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